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Article
Time to Bite the Bullet? How an Emboldened FDA
Could Take Aim at the Firearms Industry
LARS NOAH
Firearms continue to cause tremendous losses in the United States,
prompting increasingly frustrated calls for a public health response to this
endemic problem. Although Congress has legislated repeatedly on the issue
over the last century, it has not managed to do anything remotely
comprehensive in the aggregate. This Article offers a radical new approach
that has gone entirely unnoticed. Much as it tried to do a quarter of a century
ago in asserting jurisdiction over tobacco products, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) could try to use its “device” authority to rein in
companies that manufacture firearms and accessories with far too little
oversight at present. Device jurisdiction brings with it a wide range of
powers that would give the agency tremendous flexibility in designing
various ways of making guns and ammunition less hazardous to the
community. Such an initiative would confront serious political hurdles, of
course, to say nothing of an undoubtedly skeptical response by the federal
judiciary on both statutory and constitutional grounds. Nonetheless, as
happened with the FDA’s ultimately unsuccessful tobacco product
rulemaking, simply making the effort might generate some much-needed
momentum for seriously addressing this scourge.
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Time to Bite the Bullet? How an Emboldened FDA
Could Take Aim at the Firearms Industry
LARS NOAH *
I often think we should have tattooed on the back of whatever
hand we use to shoot or write, “I might be wrong.”
– Louise Penny, A Fatal Grace (2007)
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
promulgated a rule premised on its novel assertion of authority over tobacco
products.1 Four years later, the industry’s challenge reached the Supreme
Court, and the agency’s controversial effort came within one vote of
succeeding.2 Even in failure, the FDA’s high-profile but short-lived
initiative apparently had a lasting impact on public attitudes about the
responsibility of the tobacco industry,3 ultimately prompting Congress to
delegate explicit though more limited regulatory authority to the agency.4
I have long railed against the FDA’s seemingly lawless behavior.5 You
know what they say: if you can’t beat them, join them. In the course of
*
Chesterfield Smith Eminent Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Florida; author, Law,
Medicine, and Medical Technology (Foundation Press 5th ed. 2022). For my interview about this project,
hosted by the Center for Firearms Law at Duke University as part of its scholarship highlight series, see
https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/2021/01/scholarship-highlight-interview-noah-on-fda-gun-regulation/.
1
See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,615–18 (Aug. 28, 1996) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 897 (1997)).
2
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); see also infra Part II.B
(discussing the Court’s decision at length).
3
See Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in Products
Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2161 (2000) (“[T]he FDA first broke the story concerning the internal
tobacco industry records and witnesses as a prelude to its rulemaking effort in this area. The lawyers who
later capitalized on these disclosures might never have uncovered the documents or whistleblowers
without the agency’s initiative.” (footnote omitted)).
4
See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A,
tit. I, 123 Stat. 1776, 1783–842 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see also Eric
N. Lindblom, What Is “Appropriate for the Protection of the Public Health” Under the U.S. Tobacco
Control Act?, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 523, 524–33 (2020) (summarizing the legislation and the agency’s
limited initial attempts at implementation); id. at 584 (“[I]n those first ten years, FDA has not
implemented a single substantive rule to produce major reductions in the ongoing toll of unnecessary
death, disease, and disability caused by smoking.”).
5
See, e.g., Lars Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the FDA,
93 NEB. L. REV. 89, 122–24, 138 (2014); Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference
to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 924 (2008) (“[O]ver the course of
a century of struggling to protect the public health with its limited statutory powers and often inadequate
resources, the FDA evidently has institutionalized a practice of cavalierly ignoring legal constraints.”).
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criticizing the agency’s tobacco rulemaking and imagining a parade of
horribles, I wondered in passing whether it might next turn its sights on
guns.6 In retrospect, that no longer strikes me as such a crazy idea, though I
have searched in vain for anyone else previously having made such a
proposal,7 so this Article attempts to construct a serious case for targeting
manufacturers of firearms and ammunition.8 As happened with the FDA’s
astonishing effort to tackle tobacco products in the mid-1990s, such an
initiative likely would fail in the end, but it nonetheless might usefully move
the national conversation too long dominated by friends of the industry in a
more constructive direction that paid greater attention to the public health
consequences of our national obsession with guns.
Obviously, the previous occupant of the White House would never have
tolerated such a move,9 and even the moderate Democrat who replaced him
might hesitate before getting behind what paranoid gun owners would view
as an assault on their precious Second Amendment rights.10 Nevertheless,
6

See Lars Noah, Snuffing out the FDA’s Tobacco Restrictions, HEALTH L. NEWS, Sept. 2000, at 7.
[W]hat if this ever entrepreneurial agency decided to pursue what the CDC has
identified as one of our latest public health scourges⎯namely, guns and ammunition?
It’s less far-fetched than one might imagine: handguns clearly are intended to affect
the structure or function of the body, though FDA officials have reassured Congress
that the agency would not utilize its authority over medical devices in order to restrict
the sale of such products.

Id. at 15; see also Lars Noah, Regulating Cigarettes: (Non)sense and Sensibility, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 677,
691 & n.63 (1998) (concluding that “the Agency should not be free to ignore the outer boundaries of its
delegated authority in pursuit of a well-meaning crusade against a public health problem,” and citing the
FDA’s previously expressed position that it would not attempt to regulate firearms).
7
See infra note 14.
8
In contrast, I have elaborated on other crazy ideas entirely in jest. See, e.g., Lars Noah, “Go Sue
Yourself!” Imagining Intrapersonal Liability for Negligently Self-Inflicted Harms, 70 FLA. L. REV. 649,
649 n.* (2018) (“Just to be absolutely clear, I do not advocate allowing injured persons to file lawsuits
against themselves; instead, this tongue-in-cheek Article represents something of a riff on the (il)logic
and growing dysfunction of American tort law.”); see also Lars Noah, A Postmodernist Take on the
Human Embryo Research Debate, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1133, 1139 (2004) (wondering, among other things,
whether an embryo “had the same moral status as an inflamed appendix”); id. at 1140 n.26 (citing a
billboard); id. at 1152 (quoting Humpty Dumpty). Then again, once the deplorables start sending hate
mail my way, I might come to regret such excessive candor. Cf. Neil MacFarquhar et al., Assault Spawns
New Rally Cry for Extremists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2021, at A1 (“The storming of the [Capitol] building,
several analysts said, could fuel a dangerous pushback against the incoming Biden administration and its
agenda on gun control . . . and other issues by extremists who are not afraid to use violence to get their
way.”).
9
See Beth Reinhard & Sari Horwitz, With Little Fanfare, Gun Regulations Being Eased, WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 2017, at A9; see also Katie Benner, Sidestepping Washington, Barr Unveils Gun Initiative,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2019, at A22 (“Congress and the White House remain largely immobilized on the
issue.”); Mike DeBonis, Recent Shootings Haven’t Deterred GOP Efforts to Loosen Firearm Laws,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2017, at A11.
10
The election of President Barack Obama alongside Democratic Party majorities in both chambers
of Congress brought similar enthusiasm—or, for those on the other side of the fence, paranoia—about
the possibility of serious federal efforts at gun control. See, e.g., Allen Rostron, Cease Fire: A “Win-Win”
Strategy on Gun Policy for the Obama Administration, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 348 (2009)
(“While generating a quick surge in sales for the gun industry, . . . the 2008 election gave a much-needed
boost to gun control advocates . . . .”). In the end, such hopes (and fears) proved to be largely misplaced.
See Allen Rostron, A New State Ice Age for Gun Policy, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 329–40 (2016)
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needing to placate the increasingly powerful progressive wing of the
Democratic Party,11 President Biden eventually might decide to nominate a
crusading spirit to serve as Commissioner of the FDA and tolerate (if not
enthusiastically endorse) a measure of federal gun control imposed without
endlessly waiting for congressional guidance. If the political winds align in
the fashion imagined, this Article offers a basic blueprint for something
worth trying; serious roadblocks would, of course, remain in Congress and
the federal courts (whose current tilt to the right will linger long after the
latest election12), but the experience with tobacco products suggests that
simply making the effort might generate some much-needed momentum for
seriously addressing this scourge.13
I. SHOOTING BLANKS? GETTING BEYOND FEDERAL IMPOTENCE
Firearms continue to cause tremendous losses in the United States,
prompting increasingly frustrated calls for a public health response to this
endemic problem. This Part sketches out a radical new approach that has
gone entirely unnoticed,14 explaining how a federal agency tasked with
(recounting President Obama’s initial reticence to confront the problem, coupled with congressional
resistance when he finally did, prompting instead a series of fairly modest executive actions). The
Democratic Party also had controlled both chambers of Congress during President Bill Clinton’s first
two years in office, which allowed for the enactment of a pair of significant gun control laws. See infra
notes 47, 52, and accompanying text.
11
See Michelle Goldberg, Opinion, Better Than Progressives Are Fearing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2020, at A27; see also Bobby Caina Calvan, Biden Calls on Congress to Strengthen Gun Laws; President
Marks Parkland School Shooting Anniversary, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 15, 2021, at A2 (“In addition to
background checks and an assault-weapons ban, Biden is calling on Congress to outlaw high-capacity
magazines and make gun manufacturers liable for the role their products play in violence.”). Conversely,
the National Rifle Association (NRA), which in the past represented a lobbying juggernaut, has fallen on
hard times of late. See Danny Hakim, N.R.A. Seeks Texas Reboot as It Declares Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2021, at A20 (“Long the nation’s most powerful gun lobby, the N.R.A. played a diminished role
in the 2020 election, hampered by financial woes and a host of legal challenges.”). Although less well
known than the NRA, the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF) serves as the gun industry’s
primary trade association. See Tiffany Hsu, Gunmakers Fight “Trump Slump” with a Softer Sales Pitch,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2020, at B1.
12
See John Wagner, Divided Senate Confirms Trump’s 200th Judicial Pick for Federal Bench,
WASH. POST, June 25, 2020, at A3.
13
See Lars Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA’s Effort to Regulate Tobacco Products,
48 ALA. L. REV. 1, 37 (1996) (“The Agency may hope simply to prompt congressional action. . . . Imagine
that [it] next decided to tackle handgun control . . . , secure in the knowledge that such an initiative might
convince Congress to legislate a compromise but would never survive long enough to undergo careful
judicial scrutiny.”). For a retrospective penned by the FDA Commissioner who spearheaded the agency’s
assault on tobacco, see DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A
DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001).
14
See Annie Karni, White House Considers Three Executive Actions on Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2021, at A15 (reporting active consideration of minor steps that numerous other agencies might
take); cf. Dru Stevenson, The Urgent Need for Legal Scholarship on Firearm Policy, 67 BUFF. L. REV.
1449, 1497 (2019) (identifying “a dearth of scholarly commentary on administrative law issues related
to firearm regulation”). The closest that I could find was a short law review article penned by a couple
of faculty members at the Johns Hopkins University School of Public Health more than twenty years ago,
but strangely they had looked to the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) rather than the FDA for relevant guidance. See Jon S.
Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to Regulating Firearms as Consumer Products,
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protecting the public health could invoke its existing authority in a manner
that would allow it to regulate manufacturers of firearms and ammunition in
ways that might reduce the hazards associated with these products. Although
Congress has legislated repeatedly on the issue over the last century, it has
not managed to do anything remotely comprehensive in the aggregate.15 This
arguably puts the onus on the Executive branch to take the initiative, 16 but
the small federal agency expressly empowered to deal with firearms has
found itself hamstrung.17 Given this regulatory lacuna, the FDA could try to
use its “device” authority to rein in companies that manufacture weapons
and accessories with far too little oversight at present. Device jurisdiction
brings with it a wide range of powers that would give the agency tremendous
flexibility in designing various ways of making guns and ammunition less
hazardous to the community.
A. Gun-Related Injuries as a Public Health Menace
Gun violence has become far too common in the United States. Private
individuals possess an ever-growing number of firearms in this country,18
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1196, 1199 n.32, 1200, 1205 (2000); see also id. at 1203 (“Congress could
choose to lift the restrictions it imposed on the CPSC and allow that agency to exercise regulatory
authority over firearms. . . . Another regulatory option might be to create an entirely new agency, perhaps
within the Department of Justice . . . .”); cf. David Hemenway, The Public Health Approach to Reducing
Firearm Injury and Violence, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 635, 646–49 (2006) (elaborating on the analogy
to motor vehicle regulation).
15
See Katherine L. Record & Lawrence O. Gostin, What Will It Take? Terrorism, Mass Murder,
Gang Violence, and Suicides: The American Way, or Do We Strive for A Better Way?, 47 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 555, 557 (2014) (“[T]he country is in a state of political impasse. Despite public demand for
reform, federal legislators have been unable to enact laws that would protect, at least in part, the public
from gun violence.”); id. at 563–66 (listing dozens of unsuccessful gun control bills introduced in
Congress just during 2013); Reid J. Epstein et al., Despite Recent Advances, Obstacles Persist for Gun
Control Advocates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2019, at A14 (reporting that this pattern persists).
16
See Mary D. Fan, Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence,
90 IND. L.J. 151, 159 (2015) (“Change by executive action is swifter and surer than change by seeking
new laws—especially in the firearms context.”); see also Annie Karni, Biden Moves to Curb Plague of
Gun Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2021, at A1 (“Even a modest step like addressing the issue of ghost
guns . . . shows how paralyzed the politics surrounding gun control have become. . . . Given the wall of
Republican opposition, supporters of more restrictive gun laws and regulations applauded even the
modest moves that Mr. Biden announced . . . .”); cf. Philip J. Cook et al., Gun Control After Heller:
Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1050 (2009) (“[G]un
regulation in the United States is almost entirely a product of legislation rather than rulemaking processes
in administrative agencies.”).
17
See infra notes 49–50, 62, 66, and accompanying text (discussing the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)); see also Brian Freskos et al., ATF Lets Problem Dealers off
Hook; The Laws Are Lax, the Inspectors Lenient, USA TODAY, May 27, 2021, at 1A; Glenn Thrush et
al., How the Firearms Lobby Hamstrings the A.T.F., N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2021, at A1 (“In the 48 years
since its mission shifted primarily to firearms enforcement, it has been weakened by relentless assaults
from the N.R.A. that have, in the view of many, made the A.T.F. appear to be an agency engineered to
fail.”). See generally WILLIAM J. VIZZARD, IN THE CROSS FIRE: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE BUREAU
OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS (1997).
18
See Christopher Ingraham, Millions and Millions of Guns, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2015, at B2
(reporting estimates “that there were as many as 357 million civilian firearms in circulation in 2013—
more than one gun for every man, woman and child,” which means that “Americans own more guns per
capita than people in any other country on Earth”).
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and each year millions of new guns enter the civilian arsenal. Almost
40,000 Americans die each year from gunshot wounds,20 and more than
twice that number suffer serious injuries.21 The majority of these harms
qualify as self-inflicted, primarily suicides.22 Among firearm homicides,
domestic violence competes with other criminal uses,23 while widely
publicized mass shootings make a relatively minor contribution to the annual
carnage.24 Disaggregating the numbers in this fashion may help in assessing
causality and designing possible solutions, but the exercise in no way
changes the fact that the easy availability of guns has contributed to many

19
See Matthew Miller et al., Firearm Acquisition Without Background Checks: Results of a
National Survey, 166 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 233, 237 (2017) (noting that sixteen million firearms
entered the U.S. market in 2013); Victoria M. Smith et al., Broadening the Perspective on Gun Violence:
An Examination of the Firearms Industry, 1990–2015, 53 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 584, 586 (2017)
(“The number of firearms manufactured in the U.S. for domestic commerce ranged between 3 and 5
million per year between 1990 and 2005, but then grew . . . to a peak of 10.3 million in 2013.”); Dorothy
R. Novick, Opinion, Safe Gun Storage Could Prevent More Tragedies, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 5, 2021,
at A13 (“Data from FBI background checks indicate that almost 40 million firearms were purchased
across the United States in 2020. This is higher than any number on record for a single year.”).
20
See Thomas Kaplan, In Combating Gun Violence, Democrats Present a United Front, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2019, at A19; Sarah Mervosh, Nearly 40,000 Deaths from Firearms in 2017, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2018, at A19 (“More people died from firearm injuries in the United States last year
than in any other year since at least 1968, according to new data from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention.”); see also Jason E. Goldstick et al., US Firearm-Related Mortality: National, State, and
Population Trends, 1999–2017, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 1646, 1648 (2019) (“There were 114,683 firearm
deaths in 2015–17 (11.8 per 100,000 person-years—a 13.8 percent increase from 1999–2014), of which
68,810 (60.0 percent) were suicides and 43,483 (37.9 percent) were homicides . . . .”).
21
See Katherine Kaufer Christoffel, Firearm Injuries: Epidemic Then, Endemic Now, 97 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 626, 627 fig.2 (2007); Faiz Gani et al., Emergency Department Visits for Firearm-Related
Injuries in the United States, 2006–14, 36 HEALTH AFFS. 1729, 1729 (2017) (explaining that “the clinical
burden of nonfatal firearm-related injuries [is] estimated to be approximately three times that of fatal
injuries”); Bindu Kalesan et al., The Hidden Epidemic of Firearm Injury: Increasing Firearm Injury
Rates During 2001–2013, 185 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 546, 550 (2017).
22
See David M. Studdert et al., Handgun Ownership and Suicide in California, 382 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2220, 2221 (2020) (“In 2018, 24,432 suicides by firearm occurred in the United States.”); Garen
J. Wintemute, The Epidemiology of Firearm Violence in the Twenty-First Century United States, 36 ANN.
REV. PUB. HEALTH 5, 6 (2015) (“Most deaths from firearm violence are suicides, not homicides—60.5%,
on average, over the decade ending in 2012.”). The accidental discharge of firearms causes far fewer
injuries and deaths, though typically the victims are young children. See Aaron E. Carroll, Study Shows
How the Way a Gun Is Stored Can Potentially Save the Life of a Child, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2019, at
A17 (“In the last decade, guns killed more than 14,000 American children. A startling number of those
deaths—more than a third—were classified as suicides, and around 6 percent as accidents. Many more
children were injured.”); Ryan Foley et al., Accidental Shootings Put Kids in Early Graves; Minors Die
at Pace of One Every Couple of Days Because Weapons Are Mishandled, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 2016,
at 1A (reporting that the CDC’s numbers represent a significant undercount).
23
See Sarah Mervosh, Gun Ownership Tied to Domestic Homicides, Not Other Killings, Study
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2019, at A16; see also Mark Berman et al., A Burst of Bloodshed in Major
Cities, WASH. POST, July 7, 2020, at A1 (reporting that a number of children recently died as bystanders
to gun violence on the streets of urban areas); Jon Hilsenrath, Homicide Spike Hits Most Large U.S.
Cities, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2020, at A1 (“Shootings and gun violence also rose, even though many other
violent crimes such as robbery fell.”).
24
See Ali Rowhani-Rahbar et al., Long-Lasting Consequences of Gun Violence and Mass
Shootings, 321 JAMA 1765, 1765 (2019) (“[T]he frequency of mass shooting events in the United States
has been on the rise over the past 2 decades, with an increasing number of injuries and deaths . . . [though
they] comprise less than 1% of all firearm related mortality in the United States each year.”).
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of these individually tragic outcomes. Lastly, these ceaseless casualties
inflict staggering economic costs that everyone shares.26
A growing chorus of commentators view gun violence in the United
States as a public health crisis.27 Unfortunately, their pleas for gun control
have largely fallen on deaf ears, so we have seen little in the way of a public
health (i.e., population-based, prevention-oriented) response.28 Moreover,
the federal and state legislation that does exist reflects an excessive
preoccupation with the “who” and “where” of gun possession rather than the
“what” of firearm production—call it a focus on the retail as opposed to the
wholesale level.29 Just as we have witnessed some movement away from a
law enforcement emphasis in tackling the abuse of controlled substances to
more of a public health approach,30 a similar change in perspective might
25
See Charles C. Branas et al., Investigating the Link Between Gun Possession and Gun Assault,
99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2034, 2037 (2009) (“[G]un possession by urban adults was associated with a
significantly increased risk of being shot in an assault. On average, guns did not seem to protect those
who possessed them from being shot in an assault.”); Michael Siegel et al., The Relationship Between
Gun Ownership and Firearm Homicide Rates in the United States, 1981–2010, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
2098, 2103 (2013) (“[S]tates with higher levels of gun ownership had disproportionately large numbers
of deaths from firearm-related homicides.”); infra note 63 (citing comparable studies).
26
See Monica Kalra, A Ricochet of Pain—The Long Echo of Gun Violence, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1704, 1705 (2019) (“For the almost 85,000 people in the United States who were injured by firearms in
2015 . . . an estimated $900 million was spent for medical care and hospitalizations.”); id. (“Some experts
believe that firearm misuse costs the U.S. economy more than $200 billion each year in lost wages,
medical bills, and increased taxes to pay for law enforcement.”); Sarabeth A. Spitzer et al., Costs and
Financial Burden of Initial Hospitalizations for Firearm Injuries in the United States, 2006–2014, 107
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 770, 774 (2017); Wintemute, supra note 22, at 13 (“The societal costs of firearm
suicides and homicides occurring in 2010, estimated at $164.6 billion, approximated 1.1% of the US
gross domestic product that year.”).
27
See Howard Bauchner et al., Editorial, Death by Gun Violence—A Public Health Crisis, 318
JAMA 1763 (2017); Philip J. Cook, Editorial, Expanding the Public Health Approach to Gun Violence
Prevention, 169 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 723 (2018); David Hemenway & Matthew Miller, Public
Health Approach to the Prevention of Gun Violence, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2033 (2013); Steven E.
Weinberger et al., Firearm-Related Injury and Death in the United States: A Call to Action from 8 Health
Professional Organizations and the American Bar Association, 162 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 513
(2015); Jane Gross, New Group Joins Battle over Guns: Physicians, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at A18
(“The turning point, experts agree, was the publication in June 1992 of a special issue of [JAMA] devoted
to the public health consequences of violence.”); Tracy Jan, Frustration Mounts on Gun Research Curb,
BOS. GLOBE, July 5, 2016, at A1 (reporting that the American Medical Association had just adopted a
formal resolution declaring gun violence a “public health crisis”).
28
See Renee Butkus et al., Reducing Firearm Injuries and Deaths in the United States: A Position
Paper from the American College of Physicians, 169 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 704, 707 (2018) (“The
ACP has pressed for the adoption of policies to reduce the number of deaths and injuries related to
firearms for more than 20 years and is disheartened by the lack of action to protect the American
public.”); Nicholas Fandos & Thomas Kaplan, Victims Vent Frustration as Lawmakers Show Inability to
Act on Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2018, at A19.
29
See infra Part I.B. Focusing on the wholesale level may offer advantages. See Sam Kamin, The
Citizen’s Guide to Gun Control at 30, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 46, 68 (2018) (“Erecting barriers between
individuals and their weapons—gun safes, trigger locks, etc.—may not only prevent accidents but may
also give a suicidal person sufficient time and space to rethink their decision to end their life.”); Smith et
al., supra note 19, at 589 (“The finding that firearm manufacturing is highly concentrated among a small
number of companies is important because it suggests that the market may be driven by the practices of
just a handful of companies. Therefore, changes in firearm design, safety, and marketing by these few
companies could substantially affect the entire gun supply.”).
30
See Lars Noah, Federal Regulatory Responses to the Prescription Opioid Crisis: Too Little, Too
Late?, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 757, 757.
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help us respond sensibly to the consequences associated with the widespread
availability of firearms.
A quarter of a century ago, at the very same time that the FDA turned
its focus to tobacco, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts pioneered just
such a strategy. An inventive attorney general (AG), with the backing of a
politically moderate governor,31 proposed rules that took aim primarily at
firearm manufacturers rather than downstream retailers or purchasers.32 In
the absence of legislation specifically delegating any power to do so, the AG
found the requisite authority in an old and entirely generic consumer
protection statute that prohibited unfair or deceptive acts and practices.33
Issued in 1997, the final rules mandated trigger locks and other child safety
features, loaded chamber indicators or magazine safety disconnects,
tamper-resistant serial numbers, and safety instructions; they also prohibited
the sale of handguns constructed from poor quality materials.34
While a challenge filed by the industry wound its way through the
courts, the Massachusetts legislature acted to endorse and embellish upon
these rules.35 Ultimately, the state’s high court sustained most of the
regulations, holding that they passed muster even under the old consumer
protection statute.36 Obviously, the political culture in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts differs from that found in other parts of the country (and
reflected in our national legislature and federal courts), and one state can do
little to protect its citizens from noncompliant firearms entering from more
permissive nearby markets, but the White House might find that this effort
offers a handy roadmap for pursuing an initiative to adopt nationally uniform
product standards that would stand a greater chance of guarding against gun
violence.37 Although the experience in Massachusetts suggests that the
31

See Meg Vaillancourt, Weld Supports AG’s Strategy Against Pistols, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1996,

at B13.
32
See Fox Butterfield, Massachusetts to Enforce Strict Gun Safety Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2000,
at A12 (“The rules are the first consumer protection regulations in the country to concentrate on handgun
safety . . . .”); Mary McGrory, Disarming, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2000, at B1 (“The genius of the
Massachusetts solution is that it simply bypasses all the obstacles the gun lobby habitually throws in the
way of attempts to limit gun sales . . . by decreeing that guns are consumer products like all others, and
must meet certain safety standards. Credit for this breakthrough concept goes to hard-charging Scott
Harshbarger, the state’s former attorney general . . . .”).
33
See Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry Smith, Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product Safety Net:
Using State Unfair Practices Laws to Make Handguns and Other Consumer Goods Safer, 17 YALE J. ON
REG. 253, 324–25 (2000); Pierre Thomas, Massachusetts Aims Safety Rules to Hit Handguns on Bottom
Line, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1996, at A3; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Suit over Ad Could Shake Gun
Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2021, at B1 (discussing the New Jersey AG’s use of that state’s consumer
protection statute to unearth incriminating records related to promotional practices).
34
See 940 MASS. CODE REGS. ch. 16 (2020); Pamela Ferdinand, Massachusetts’s Gun Laws Take
Heavy Toll on Sales; Licensed Dealers Dwindle as More Controls Are Proposed, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,
2001, at A3.
35
See Pamela Ferdinand, Mass. to Enforce Toughest Handgun Rules in U.S., WASH. POST, Apr. 4,
2000, at A15 (“They were issued in 1997—one year before Massachusetts legislators passed the nation’s
strictest gun control law, which includes many similar quality and safety provisions.”).
36
See Am. Shooting Sports Council v. Att’y Gen., 711 N.E.2d 899, 902–08 (Mass. 1999).
37
See Benjamin Bejar, Note, Wielding the Consumer Protection Shield: Sensible Handgun
Regulation in Massachusetts: A Paradigm for a National Model?, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 59, 85 (1998)
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could employ its identical authority over
unfair or deceptive business practices,38 the FDA has the relevant public
health expertise and, as explained below, arguably already enjoys clearer
jurisdiction to regulate firearms and ammunition.
B. Congress Has Responded in a Chaotic Fashion
Federal firearm laws have gradually expanded over the last century. In
1918, Congress imposed a 10% excise tax on weapons and ammunition;39 in
1927, it prohibited the shipment of pistols, revolvers, and other concealable
firearms through the U.S. mails.40 In 1934, Congress responded to
Prohibition Era violence by requiring the registration of owners—and
imposing a $200 tax on transfers to private individuals—of machine guns,
short barrel (sawed-off) shotguns, silencers and the like in the hopes of
making them inaccessible to gangsters.41 Four years later, it required the
licensing of manufacturers, importers, and dealers of guns and ammunition
shipped in interstate commerce, prohibited these licensees from knowingly
selling such items to certain criminals, and required dealers to maintain
records of transactions.42
(“Without uniform federal regulations, however, the burden will remain on each state to protect its
citizens from these dangerous consumer products.”); Daniel LeDuc, Marching for Uniform Gun Laws;
“Million Mom” Organizers Want Congress to Set National Standards, WASH. POST, May 12, 2000, at
A1; see also Hemenway, supra note 14, at 651 (“[A] crucial first step would seem to be to create a new
agency or provide an existing agency with the power to regulate firearms as a consumer product.”).
38
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018); see also Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney
General Enforcement of Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Laws: Emerging Concerns and
Solutions, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 209, 211–16, 242–43 (2016) (discussing some of the similarities and
differences between federal and state laws in this area, though focusing on enforcement actions rather
than rulemaking); cf. Jon S. Vernick et al., Regulating Firearm Advertisements That Promise Home
Protection: A Public Health Intervention, 277 JAMA 1391 (1997) (explaining that the FTC had received
citizen petitions from public interest organizations alleging that industry ads extolling the defensive
benefits of handgun ownership qualified as unfair and deceptive).
39
See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 900(10), 40 Stat. 1057, 1122 (1919); see also
Frances Stead Sellers, Hunting Is Declining, Creating a Crisis for Conservation, WASH. POST, Feb. 3,
2020, at A3 (referencing “the 1937 passage of the Pittman-Robertson Act, which imposed an 11 percent
excise tax on the sale of firearms that is apportioned annually to state agencies for conservation”). The
excise tax remained at 10% for pistols and revolvers. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No.
83-591, 68A Stat. 3, 490 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4181 (2018)); see also 16 U.S.C. § 669b(a)(1) (2018)
(earmarking proceeds for state wildlife restoration projects).
40
See Pub. L. No. 69-583, 44 Stat. 1059, 1060 (1927) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1715)
(exempting shipments to “bona fide dealers”).
41
See National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 73-474, §§ 3(a), 5(a), 48 Stat. 1236, 1237–38 (1934)
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872 (2018)); see also United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,
178 (1939) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to convictions for the interstate movement of an
unregistered short-barreled shotgun); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 511–14 (1937) (rejecting
a challenge to the separate $200 annual license tax on dealers of covered firearms); cf. Haynes v. United
States, 390 U.S. 85, 96–100 (1968) (holding that the registration requirement conflicted with the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination). Two years earlier, Congress had prohibited the
possession of any firearm that “shoots automatically or semiautomatically more than twelve shots
without reloading” in the District of Columbia. See Pub. L. No. 72-275, §§ 1, 14, 47 Stat. 650, 654 (1932)
(codified as amended at D.C. CODE §§ 22-4501, 22-4516).
42
See Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, §§ 2–3, 52 Stat. 1250, 1250–52 (1938) (repealed
by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 906, 82 Stat. 197,
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After a three-decade lull, and prompted by a pair of high-profile
assassinations, Congress decided to enhance existing gun control measures.
In 1968, it limited, among other things, the interstate transfers of handguns
and raised the minimum handgun purchase age to twenty-one, and it
enhanced the requirements for licensing sellers while barring a broader
range of individuals from purchasing weapons (adding, for instance, minors,
the mentally ill, and drug abusers).43 With limited exceptions for wholly
intrastate activities, only those persons with a federal firearms license could
produce or sell guns.44 As it had done earlier in the century when imposing
taxes, Congress delegated the power to regulate licensees to the Department
of Treasury.45 In addition, it barred the importation of guns unless certified
by the agency as “particularly suitable for . . . sporting purposes.”46
Twenty-five years later, the Brady Act inaugurated a national system of
background checks to better enforce the restrictions on persons allowed to
purchase firearms.47 In order to implement this law, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) established the National Instant Criminal Background
Check System (NICS).48 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &
Explosives (ATF), however, represents the federal agency that enjoys the
clearest delegated authority over guns. Previously just denominated as the
234); see also Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 133, 143 (1975) (“Congress got pretty much what it wanted in the F.F.A.: a symbolic denunciation
of firearms in the hands of criminals, coupled with an inexpensive and ineffective regulatory scheme that
did not inconvenience the American firearms industry or its customers.”).
43
See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1214–26 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–931 (2018)); see also id. § 102, 82 Stat. at 1214 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4)(B)) (defining as a “destructive device” any weapon whose barrel has a bore greater
than half an inch in diameter except for shotguns found to be “generally recognized as particularly
suitable for sporting purposes”). But see Hirschfeld v. ATF, 5 F.4th 407, 452 (4th Cir.) (invalidating the
age restriction under the Second Amendment), vacated as moot, 14 F.4th 322 (4th Cir. 2021).
44
See Keersten Heskin, Note, Easier Than Obtaining a Driver’s License: The Federal Licensing of
Gun Dealers, 46 FLA. L. REV. 805, 825–34 (1994).
45
See 18 U.S.C. § 926; see also Zimring, supra note 42, at 150 (“The regulation of interstate traffic
(in the Act and its regulations) was stronger than under the Federal Firearms Act, but there were, of
course, opportunities for evasion. The [intrastate] sale of guns by nondealers was, from the beginning,
outside of any record-keeping requirement of the Act.”).
46
18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3); see also Zimring, supra note 42, at 154–56, 163–67 (discussing questions
about the operation of this provision).
47
See Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 102, 107 Stat.
1536, 1536–41 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921). The law initially applied only to handgun
purchases, but, after a five-year interim period, the background check requirement would become
applicable to other firearms (i.e., long guns) as well. See id. §§ 102(a)–(b), 103(b). Three years after
passage, the Lautenberg amendment added to the list of prohibited purchasers’ certain individuals
convicted of domestic violence. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–371 (1996); see also Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272,
2278–82 (2016) (broadly construing this restriction).
48
See National Instant Criminal Background Check System Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,303,
58,307 (Oct. 30, 1998) (codified as amended at 28 C.F.R. pt. 25). It does not, however, apply to private
sales. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Adeel Hassan, Simple Way for Abusers, Felons and Fugitives to Buy
a Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2019, at A14 (“Transactions between private sellers and buyers do not
require a background check. That used to typically just mean sales at gun shows, or through listings found
in classified ads. But that was before the internet made it as easy as a few mouse clicks to find a gun for
sale from a private seller on an online marketplace or through social media.”).
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Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, and housed within the Department
of Treasury to reflect its focus on collecting revenue from these otherwise
little-regulated products,49 ATF acquired its current designation when it
moved to the Department of Justice in 2003.50
In 1994, Congress enacted a pair of significant measures related to
firearms. First, it reinforced the federal age restriction by prohibiting
handgun possession by and sale to persons under 18 years of age.51 Second,
and more controversially, Congress enacted a prohibition on the possession
and sale of newly manufactured “assault weapons” and large-capacity
magazines.52 The legislation sunset after ten years, however, when
congressional efforts to extend the ban failed.53
On occasion, and wholly apart from the excise tax that it had imposed
in 1918, Congress has focused on ammunition. In 1986, after banning (rather
than just taxing) private possession of newly manufactured machine guns,54
it barred the sale of “cop killer” bullets.55 This prohibition got expanded in
49
See Zimring, supra note 42, at 157 (explaining that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had
created this division in 1942 to implement federal firearm laws and that thirty years later the Treasury
Department reorganized ATF as a separate bureau); Fox Butterfield, Bill Would Subject Guns to Federal
Safety Controls, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at A10.
50
See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1111, 116 Stat. 2135, 2274 (codified
at 6 U.S.C. § 531) (splitting off ATF’s revenue collection function into a new unit that remained within
the Treasury Department); see also 28 U.S.C. § 599A(b)(1) (2018).
51
See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110201(a),
108 Stat. 1796, 2010–11 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)) (also known as the Youth Handgun Safety Act).
52
See id. tit. XI(A), 108 Stat. at 1996–2010 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a), 922(v)–(w), appendix,
923(i)); see also Allen Rostron, High-Powered Controversy: Gun Control, Terrorism, and the Fight over
.50 Caliber Rifles, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1415, 1434–35 (2005).
53
See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110105(2), 108 Stat. at 2000; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Effort to Renew
Weapons Ban Falters on Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at A1. Subsequent efforts to resurrect the law
in the wake of the Sandy Hook massacre failed as well. See Jonathan Weisman, Gun Control Drive
Blocked in Senate; Obama, in Defeat, Sees “Shameful Day,” N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013, at A1; see also
John J. Phelan IV, Note, The Assault Weapons Ban—Politics, the Second Amendment, and the Country’s
Continued Willingness to Sacrifice Innocent Lives for “Freedom,” 77 ALB. L. REV. 579, 598–603 (2014)
(suggesting ways of tightening the expired federal ban); John Donohue & Theodora Boulouta, Opinion,
That Assault Weapon Ban Worked, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2019, at A27 (“[D]ata from the 15 years
following the ban’s expiration now provide stronger evidence that permitting the gun industry to flood
the market with increasingly powerful weapons that allow for faster killing has facilitated exactly that
outcome.”). In contrast, our neighbors to the north recently managed to adopt such a law. See Ian Austen,
After Nova Scotia Killings, Canada Bans Assault Rifles, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2020, at A19.
54
See Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 102, 100 Stat. 449, 453 (1986)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)); see also Demko v. United States, 216 F.3d 1049, 1051–53 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (rejecting a challenge to the ATF’s refusal to exempt a particular large caliber semiautomatic
shotgun from statutory restrictions); Rostron, supra note 52, at 1428–34 (discussing other changes
inaugurated by these amendments); id. at 1466 (summarizing “the additional rules and restrictions
accompanying classification as an NFA weapon, including more thorough background checks, a
significant waiting period, law enforcement discretion over access to the weapons, and a comprehensive
system of registration”). ATF recently amended its rules to treat “bump stocks” as machine guns. See
Bump-Stock-Type Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 66,514, 66,553–54 (Dec. 26, 2018) (codified at 27 C.F.R.
§§ 447.11, 478.11, 479.11); see also Guedes v. ATF, 920 F.3d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (affirming the
denial of a preliminary injunction); Aposhian v. Barr, 958 F.3d 969 (10th Cir.) (same), vacated for en
banc rehrg., 973 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2020), reinstated sub nom. Aposhian v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 890
(10th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
55
See Pub. L. No. 99-408, 100 Stat. 920 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(17)(B));
Reagan Signs Ban on Armor-Piercing “Cop-Killer” Bullets, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1986, at A4. A couple
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1994 to cover other armor-piercing, metal-alloy ammunition. Aside from
these narrowly focused bans, coupled with the decade-long prohibition on
large-capacity magazines, federal legislation has largely disregarded the
types of ammunition sold to civilians.
During much of this same period, Congress demonstrated equal interest
in preventing other entities from taking action. In 1976, for instance, the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), which the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) implements, excluded guns and ammunition.57 That same
year, Congress expressly barred the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC) from restricting the sale of firearms and ammunition,58 even though
the statute creating the Commission just four years earlier already appeared
to exclude these products from its jurisdiction.59 In 1986, Congress enacted
the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act,60 which amended several sections of
the Gun Control Act of 1968 to, among other things, preempt state or local
laws that would prevent the interstate transportation of an unloaded and
of years later, Congress outlawed firearms designed to evade metal detectors or x-ray machines. See
Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-649, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 3816 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 922(p)).
56
See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110519, 108 Stat. at 2020 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(17)). A
couple of years later, Congress called for a study on the quantities and uses of ammunition. See
Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 809, 110 Stat. 1214, 1311.
57
See Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 3, 90 Stat. 2003, 2004 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2602(2)(B)(v)) (cross-referencing the firearms excise tax provision); cf. Felicity Barringer, Groups
Seek Ban on Lead in Sporting Ammunition, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A15 (discussing a petition filed
with the EPA). This has left other agencies, primarily the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS), to address
concerns about environmental contamination from lead shot on a piecemeal basis. See 50 C.F.R. § 20.108
(2020) (banning its use for hunting waterfowl effective 1991); see also id. § 20.134 (creating a
mechanism for approval of nontoxic types of shot and coatings); Darryl Fears, Endangered Species Act
Is Itself Endangered, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2017, at E5 (“One of the first things the Interior Department
did under its new secretary, Ryan Zinke, was rescind an Obama administration regulation that [would
have more broadly] outlawed hunting with lead shot.”).
58
See Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-284,
§ 3(e), 90 Stat. 503, 504 (“The [CPSC] shall make no ruling or order that restricts the manufacture or
sale of firearms, firearms ammunition, or components of firearms ammunition, including black powder
or gunpowder for firearms.”). This provision did not, for instance, appear designed to address a
jurisdictional dispute that had arisen over stun guns. See Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Heller and
Nonlethal Weapons, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1387, 1400 (2009) (“When Tasers were first developed, the
[CPSC] claimed jurisdiction in 1975, followed by the [ATF] in 1976; these agencies meddled with sales
to the public, and even banned them for a time.” (footnotes omitted)); cf. Eugene Volokh, Nonlethal
Self-Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and the Rights to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend
Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 199, 211 n.44 (2009) (explaining that, at the time of ATF’s 1976 ruling, Tasers
used gunpowder to fire their barbs, only later switching to compressed nitrogen).
59
See Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 3, 86 Stat. 1207, 1208 (1972) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(5)(E)) (excluding from the definition of “consumer product” any
article subject to the tax imposed under 26 U.S.C. § 4181, which had imposed an excise tax on firearms,
shells, and cartridges); cf. Bejar, supra note 37, at 61 n.13 (noting that the original Senate bill would have
granted the CPSC jurisdiction over firearms); Erik Larson, Wild West Legacy: Ruger Gun Often Fires If
Dropped, but Firm Sees No Need for Recall, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1993, at A1 (reporting that, in 1991,
the General Accounting Office urged Congress to delegate authority over firearms to the CPSC). The
statute also excludes from the CPSC’s jurisdiction “devices” as defined under the FDA’s enabling statute.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(5)(h).
60
Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986); see also David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners’
Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 627–80 (1987) (offering a
comprehensive assessment of this complex legislation).
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61

inaccessible firearm, and to prevent the ATF from taking or sharing dealer
records and from creating a system to register firearms or owners.62
In 1996, responding to a pair of prominent studies funded by the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),63 an appropriations rider
known as the Dickey Amendment limited that agency’s ability to underwrite
research on gun violence,64 a restriction that remains in place more than two
decades later.65 In 2003, Congress used an appropriations measure to prevent

61

Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 107, 100 Stat. at 460 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 926A).
Id. § 106, 100 Stat. at 459 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 926(a)); see also Jeanne Marie Laskas, Inside
the Federal Bureau of Way Too Many Guns, GQ (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.gq.com/story/inside-fed
eral-bureau-of-way-too-many-guns (reporting how these restrictions have hamstrung the ATF).
63
See Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for Homicide in the Home, 329
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1084, 1087 (1993) (“Although firearms are often kept in homes for personal
protection, this study shows that the practice is counterproductive.”); Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Suicide
in the Home in Relation to Gun Ownership, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 467, 471 (1992) (“The ready
availability of firearms appears to be associated with an increased risk of suicide in the home.”). In a
comprehensive review of the literature conducted two decades later, these two studies counted among
only sixteen that satisfied the criteria for inclusion. See Andrew Anglemyer et al., The Accessibility of
Firearms and Risk for Suicide and Homicide Victimization Among Household Members: A Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis, 160 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 101, 102 & tbl.1 (2014); see also id. at 109
(“[W]e found the association between firearm availability and homicide to be more modest than that
between firearm availability and completed suicide.”).
64
See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009,
3009–244 (1996) (“[N]one of the funds made available for injury prevention and control at the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention may be used to advocate or promote gun control.”); see also Michael
Luo, Sway of N.R.A. Blocks Studies, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A1. Fifteen years later,
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) faced a similar prohibition when the language of this rider was
expanded to cover other units in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). See Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, Div. F, tit. II, § 218, 125 Stat. 786, 1085 (2011) (“None
of the funds made available in this title may be used, in whole or in part, to advocate or promote gun
control.”); see also Arthur L. Kellermann & Frederick P. Rivara, Silencing the Science on Gun Research,
309 JAMA 549, 549–50 (2013) (explaining that the publication of a study funded by a component of the
NIH had prompted this move).
65
See Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, § 210, 133 Stat. 2534,
2579 (2019). Although the FDA resides within HHS and represents a part of the Public Health Service
alongside the CDC and NIH, its appropriations appear in an entirely different part of the budget
legislation (in Division B, Title VI, alongside the Department of Agriculture, which had housed the
agency until 1940, rather than in Division A, Title II). Thus, the FDA would never have had to abide by
this rider. Moreover, when included in 2018, an accompanying report explained that the rider would not
bar support of research into the causes of gun violence. See Allen Rostron, Editorial, The Dickey
Amendment on Federal Funding for Research on Gun Violence: A Legal Dissection, 108 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 865, 866 (2018); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, With C.D.C. Funds, Gun Violence Researchers
Seek Path Around Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2021, at A17 (reporting that starting in 2019, with an
annual appropriation of $25 million earmarked for this purpose though split with NIH, the CDC “is once
again funding research into gun violence after a nearly 25-year hiatus imposed by Congress”).
62
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the ATF from disclosing its gun trace data; one year later, another rider
required the destruction of background check records within 24 hours.67
In 2005, Congress acted to displace most tort litigation against the gun
industry,68 which arguably makes the need for serious regulatory scrutiny
that much more pressing.69 At the same time, it required that makers and
sellers of handguns provide secure storage or other child safety devices such
as trigger locks and incentivized their use by owners.70 In 2009, Congress
loosened a pair of restrictions related to carrying loaded weapons on federal
property.71 One year thereafter, the Affordable Care Act included a special
provision designed to safeguard the Second Amendment rights of patients.72
In short, Congress has acted sporadically, addressing only limited facets
of gun violence and largely ignoring the possibility of imposing controls at
the manufacturer level.73 Instead, it has focused its attention on the retail
66

See Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, Div. J, § 644, 117 Stat.
11, 473; see also Colin Miller, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Why the Tiahrt Amendment’s Ban on the
Admissibility of ATF Trace Data in State Court Actions Violates the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 665, 676–82 (discussing the origin and subsequent changes to this
recurring rider); Erica Goode & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Legal Curbs Said to Hamper A.T.F. in Gun
Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2012, at A1; Ali Watkins, How the N.R.A. Uses Its Influence to Hobble
Federal Gun Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2018, at A12 (reporting that the gun lobby has “pushed
Congress to enact restrictions on how the bureau spends money to curtail its ability to regulate firearms
and track gun crimes”).
67
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, Div. B, § 617(a)(2), 118 Stat.
3, 95.
68
See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, §§ 2–4, 119 Stat. 2095,
2095–99 (2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903); see also City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 392–98 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting various constitutional objections to this statute).
69
See Andrew J. McClurg, The Second Amendment Right to Be Negligent, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1, 7–8
(2016) (“Because no federal gun safety design regulations exist, the absence of a threat of tort liability
leaves gun manufacturers with little incentive to implement safer gun designs . . . .” (footnote omitted));
Jon S. Vernick et al., Availability of Litigation as a Public Health Tool for Firearm Injury Prevention:
Comparison of Guns, Vaccines, and Motor Vehicles, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1991, 1996 (2007) (“[T]he
lack of both regulation and litigation as public health tools for firearm injury prevention is a potentially
dangerous combination for the public’s health.”); id. at 1995 (complaining that this statute “simply
eliminates litigation’s feedback mechanism without providing an alternative means to ensure the safe
design and distribution of firearms”); id. at 1994 (“[U]nlike the case with virtually every other consumer
product in the United States, no federal agency has the authority to regulate the safe design of firearms.”).
70
See Child Safety Lock Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-92, § 5, 119 Stat. 2095, 2099–101 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(z), 924(p)). This legislation largely codified what the industry had
promised to do almost a decade earlier. See James Bennet, Gun Makers Agree on Safety Locks, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, at A1.
71
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 4, Div. A, tit. I, 123 Stat.
3034, 3061 (2009) (calling for guidance to allow transportation of guns in checked baggage on Amtrak);
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 512, 123
Stat. 1734, 1764 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1a-7b) (overriding rules that banned carrying loaded guns on
national parkland); see also Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-295, § 557, 120 Stat. 1355, 1391 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5207) (barring confiscation of guns
during a disaster or emergency).
72
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub L. No. 111-148, § 10101(e)(2), 124
Stat. 119, 884–85 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17(c)).
73
See Stevenson, supra note 14, at 1455 (“No other product on the market causes as many deaths
of both consumers and innocent bystanders while having no federal regulations requiring safety features,
warning labels, or manufacturing specifications.”); Vernick & Teret, supra note 14, at 1196 (“Noticeably
absent in the United States, however, are laws governing the design, manufacture, and marketing of
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level, while at the same time legislating to insulate the industry from
unwelcome scrutiny and to expand the freedom enjoyed by lawful gun
owners. Insofar as Congress has demonstrated that it cannot muster the
courage to lead on this issue, the Executive branch should take a stab at
regulating firearms under already broad delegations of authority to a public
health agency.
C. Characterizing Guns and Ammo as “Devices”
In tandem with significant legislative milestones related to firearms and
ammunition, Congress has delineated a seemingly broad category of
so-called “devices” subject to the FDA’s control. In 1938, the same year that
it passed the Federal Firearms Act, Congress enacted the federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),74 which for the first time granted the FDA
jurisdiction over devices. In 1976, the same year that it reiterated the CPSC’s
lack of any authority over firearms and excluded the EPA from exercising
any comparable powers under TSCA,75 Congress greatly expanded the
FDA’s authority to regulate devices.76
Pursuant to the FDCA, “drug” means “articles intended for use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or
other animals . . . [or] intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body of man or other animals.”77 The 1938 statute included parallel language
to define a different product category: “The term ‘device’ . . . means
instruments, apparatus, and contrivances, including their components, parts,
and accessories, intended (1) for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; or (2) to affect
the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.”78 Thus,
Congress had delegated to the FDA jurisdiction to regulate products
firearms. . . . [N]o federal agency has the authority to establish standards for their safe design.”). Even
more so than vehicles, of course, the existing supply of guns turns over at a slow rate. See United States
v. Singer, 943 F.2d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[F]irearms, unlike drugs, are durable goods useful to their
owners for long periods of time.”). This means that fixes imposed at the manufacturer level will take far
longer to make a difference than efforts targeting possession, though restrictions on allowable forms of
ammunition would have a more immediate impact. Cf. Ron Berler, Opinion, Keep the Guns, Just Get Rid
of the Bullets, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 13, 2019, at A14 (“[H]ere’s what would happen if the manufacture
of today’s standard-size rounds were outlawed, and .23, .39 and .46-caliber rounds took their place:
Eventually, gun owners would run out of the old ammo, and their weapons would become paperweights.
. . . To use the recalibrated rounds, people would have to purchase new weapons to fire them.”); Sam
Roberts, Controlling Guns: One Idea Starts with the Bullets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1990, at B1 (discussing
a proposal by Senator Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) to ban bullets for .25- and .32-caliber and 9-millimeter
semiautomatic weapons).
74
Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 331–397). Senator
Royal Copeland (D-N.Y.) had served as the principal author of both of these statutes.
75
See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
76
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539, 540 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
77
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2018). Until 1990, the last clause of this definitional section included the
proviso that the term “does not include devices or their components, parts, or accessories.”
78
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1974).
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intended to serve diagnostic or therapeutic purposes as well as products
intended to affect the structure or function of the body.79 Courts sometimes
struggled in trying to distinguish drugs and devices,80 prompting Congress
in 1976 to add the proviso that a device “does not achieve any of its principal
intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or
other animals and . . . is not dependent upon being metabolized for the
achievement of any of its principal intended purposes.”81
The “intended use” of a product plays a central role in defining the reach
of the FDA’s authority.82 Typically the agency looks to labeling and any
other promotional claims made by the seller.83 A regulation governing
labeling requirements for devices provides, however, that intended use also
“may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the distribution of the
article.”84 Indeed, the FDA relied on the latter when it asserted regulatory
jurisdiction over tobacco products, a contested issue that the U.S. Supreme
Court ultimately left unresolved when it invalidated that initiative.85
79
When it created a tax deduction for the costs of “medical care” four years later, Congress defined
that phrase using language identical to these clauses from the drug and device definitions. See Revenue
Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 127(a), 56 Stat. 798, 825–26 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 213(d)(1)(A)). Because the deduction covers only medical expenses, however, the clauses may operate
somewhat more narrowly than those used in the FDCA.
80
See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . . , 394 U.S. 784, 798–801
(1969) (sustaining an FDA decision to classify antibiotic sensitivity discs as drugs rather than devices);
AMP Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825, 829–31 (2d Cir. 1968) (same, for a ligature product that used nylon
suture material to tie off blood vessels).
81
See Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 3(a)(1)(A), 90 Stat. at 575 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(h)(3) (2018) (replacing, for instance, both uses of the term “principal” with the term “primary”)).
Congress also expanded the diagnostic use clause to cover “conditions” in addition to diseases, and it
dropped the use of plural forms in the original introductory clause (“instruments, apparatus,
contrivances” and such) while further broadening that list to include the following items: “implement,
machine, . . . implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article.”
82
See Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free Speech vs. Public Health Promotion
(at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 55–56 n.112 (2011).
83
See, e.g., United States v. Article of Drug Designated B-Complex Cholinos Capsules, 362 F.2d
923, 925–26 (3d Cir. 1966) (radio broadcasts); Nature Food Ctrs., Inc. v. United States, 310 F.2d 67, 70
(1st Cir. 1962) (public lectures); United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 556, 563–64
(W.D.N.Y. 1986) (oral representations made by authorized sales distributors).
84
See 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (2020) (“This objective intent may . . . be shown . . . by circumstances in
which the article is, with the knowledge of such persons or their representatives, offered and used for a
purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised.”); see also Regulations Regarding “Intended Uses,”
86 Fed. Reg. 41,383, 41,401 (Aug. 2, 2021) (amending this rule); United States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp.
2d 115, 118–19 (D.D.C. 2001) (allowing for the prosecution of defendants for selling balloons filled with
nitrous oxide (laughing gas) outside of a rock concert even though they had made no representations that
these products would affect the structure or function of the body); id. at 119 (“This case is obviously
unique in that, if the government’s allegations are true, the sellers did not need to label or advertise their
product, as the environment provided the necessary information between buyer and seller.”).
85
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131–32 (2000) (declining to
address the industry’s argument that only claims made to consumers could provide the basis for finding
an intended drug or device use). In contrast, after giving the issue close scrutiny, four members of the
Court unreservedly endorsed the FDA’s broad interpretation of this statutory language as entitled to
deference. See id. at 170–74 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 170 (“[E]ven in the absence of express claims,
the FDA has regulated products that affect the body if the manufacturer wants, and knows, that consumers
so use the product.”); see also id. at 172 (“Although in recent decades cigarette manufacturers have
stopped making express health claims in their advertising, consumers have come to understand what the
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The FDA has, however, twice seemingly disavowed enjoying any
authority over firearms. While testifying at a Senate subcommittee hearing
that focused on the dangers of products such as “Chemical Mace”
self-defense spray in 1969 (one year after fairly exhaustive legislative
activity on firearms), the Commissioner and Chief Counsel of the FDA made
some remarks about the agency’s lack of authority over firearms.86 In 1996,
in the preamble to its final rule asserting jurisdiction over tobacco products,
the FDA answered public comments imagining a slippery slope by
explaining that the rule would not serve as precedent for treating guns as

companies no longer need to express—that through chemical action cigarettes stabilize mood, sedate,
stimulate, and help suppress appetite.”).
86
See Public Sale of Protective Chem. Sprays: Hearing Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Sen.
Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong. 37 (1969) (statement of William W. Goodrich, FDA Chief Counsel)
(“I suppose that pistols and bullets are intended to affect the function or structure of the body in the same
way these [self-defense chemical sprays] are, but we concluded that the products could not properly be
classified as drugs under the definition in the [FDCA].”). This came in response to a question from
Senator Moss (D-Utah), chairman of the subcommittee, about “a premarketing clearance approach,” id.,
which in that era only classification as a “new drug” would have accomplished. Cf. id. at 44 (testimony
of Paul R. Dixon, FTC Chairman) (noting that the FDA “has ruled that these chemical sprays do not meet
the definition of a ‘drug’”). To the extent that officials from the FDA who testified at the hearing
discussed guns rather than chemical sprays, they focused on devices used to propel canisters of tear gas
(a.k.a. lacrymating agents). See id. at 28–29 (testimony of Herbert L. Ley, FDA Commissioner); id. at
26–27 (explaining FDA labeling regulation pursuant to the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA));
id. at 39, 41 (describing the nature of injuries reported from this type of dispenser). The Commissioner
did speak briefly about traditional firearms, though expressing his views about wise policy rather than
the scope of the agency’s potential regulatory jurisdiction:
We also require, for example, in the labeling of shotgun shells, which fall under the
same act [i.e., the FHSA], the statement that this box contains shotgun shells. We do
not go into the details and principles of the proper handling of a shotgun. I believe
that the consumer education in the use of firearms and other weapons is not an
appropriate area for FDA to function in. This is a weapon.
Id. at 35; see also id. at 35–36 (responding to Senator Moss’s follow-up question about “authority to go
further” by again focusing on the lacrymating agents, though alluding to earlier testimony [referenced on
p.7] about asserting drug jurisdiction as “the most drastic approach”); id. at 37 (same, but again without
ruling it out as theoretically possible); id. at 41–43 (same, in responding to Senator Cotton’s questions).
Even the official statement on the narrower question of exercising drug jurisdiction over chemical sprays
used for law enforcement seemed to equivocate. See id. at 61 (letter from William H. Stewart, Surgeon
General, U.S. Public Health Service) (“While ‘Chemical Mace’ and related formulations . . . do not fit,
in our opinion, within the definition of ‘drugs’ under the purview of the [FDA] we plan to encourage
further studies, particularly to determine possible chronic effects. As additional information is available,
we will revise our recommendations as necessary.”).
In short, the testimony from the FDA officials at this hearing never once mentioned the potential
reach of the agency’s device jurisdiction, declined to extend its drug jurisdiction over chemical
self-defense sprays, though without entirely dismissing the possibility of doing so in the future, and made
passing references to more traditional weapons, conceding that such products intend to affect the
structure or function of the body, though preferring to steer clear of that subject altogether. For a
discussion on how such testimony might impact judicial review of statutory objections, see infra notes
204–12 and accompanying text. Although he did not address firearms in particular, Mr. Goodrich’s
immediate successor as Chief Counsel famously staked out a far broader conception of the FDA’s
regulatory jurisdiction, believing that it extended to anything consistent with promoting the public health
unless explicitly prohibited by Congress. See Noah, The Little Agency That Could, supra note 5, at 918–
19 (summarizing and critiquing this position espoused by Peter Barton Hutt).
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87

devices. Although such a reassurance might qualify as a general statement
of policy deserving some respect,88 the agency ventured this remark exactly
a quarter of a century ago in connection with a rulemaking process that had
related to an entirely different subject. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has
roundly disparaged similar sorts of dicta that the FDA has sprinkled into
other rulemaking preambles.89
A good deal more clearly than tobacco products, firearms and
ammunition represent “instruments, apparatus, and contrivances, including
their components, parts, and accessories intended . . . to affect the structure
or any function of the body of man or other animals.” Their lack of any
therapeutic use or other medical application would have surprisingly little
bearing on the question. In the original FDCA, Congress had opted to use
the unadorned term “device,” and sweeping amendments enacted decades
later generally continued to do so even while the titles of the newer
legislation made reference to “medical” devices.90
87
In response to comments that feared this use of the structure-or-function clause “might provide
precedent for applying the provision to a wide range of products that have effects on the structure or
function of the body—including guns and other weapons,” the FDA explained that it “has never
construed the structure-function provision to include products such as guns, airbags, and chemical sprays,
and applying the structure-function provision to nicotine-delivering tobacco products will not provide
any precedent for doing so.” Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products
Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional
Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 44,684–85 (Aug. 28, 1996). Historically accurate as a descriptive
matter but otherwise unilluminating. The agency did, however, elaborate by attempting to distinguish the
cases as follows:

[T]here are fundamental distinctions between these products and nicotine-delivering
tobacco products. Cigarettes deliver a pharmacologically active dose of the drug
nicotine to the body through inhalation. Smokeless tobacco delivers a
pharmacologically active dose of the same drug through buccal absorption.
Collectively, tobacco products achieve their effects on the structure and function of
the body through nicotine’s pharmacological effects. These include sedation,
stimulation, weight control, and maintenance of addiction. Tobacco products are thus
indistinguishable from products that the Agency has traditionally regulated as drugs
and devices. In contrast, guns, airbags, and chemical sprays are markedly different
and distinguishable from such products.
Id. at 44,685. True but utterly meaningless—a tobacco product may represent a drug-device combination,
and, as its primary mechanism of action is pharmacological, should face regulation as a drug rather than
a device. See Noah, supra note 13, at 23–27. Most conventional devices do not come prefilled with or
otherwise deliver pharmacological agents and therefore plainly qualify as unadorned devices. I agree that
the contorted jurisdictional analysis characterizing tobacco products as devices fails to set any precedent
for doing so with guns, and not simply because the courts subsequently rebuffed it—perhaps that analysis
would help if trying to squeeze tranquilizer darts into the device box, but firearms and ammunition
literally satisfy the structure-or-function clause of the statutory definition so much more clearly!
88
See 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(d)(1) (2020). The rule emphasized that the agency remained entirely free
to subsequently revisit a previously announced policy. See id. § 10.85(d)–(h); see also Lars Noah, The
FDA’s New Policy on Guidelines: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 113 (1997)
(discussing a proposal to revoke this rule).
89
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575–81 (2009). No such language had appeared in the
preamble to the proposed rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (Aug. 11, 1995), or the accompanying jurisdictional
statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453 (Aug. 11, 1995), so this assertion of general policy did not itself get
subjected to notice-and-comment procedures.
90
See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539, 540; Safe Medical
Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4520. Subsequent legislation began to include the
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Contrary to the frequent assumption that Congress intended to delegate
jurisdiction over only those devices having some medical application, the
FDA has classified as devices a number of products lacking any intended
therapeutic use.91 It also has persuaded courts that it could use its device
authority to regulate plainly nonmedical items.92 For instance, the FDA
treats sunlamps and other indoor tanning equipment, which serve primarily
cosmetic purposes, as devices,93 and it recently has increased the rigor of its
requirements in response to concerns about malignant melanoma and other
skin cancers.94 Even hypodermic needles and syringes, which plainly qualify
as devices,95 may get put to non-therapeutic uses such as recreational drug
abuse or lethal injection.
adjective “medical” to modify the term “device” in the statutory text as well. See, e.g., Medical Device
User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-250, § 102, 116 Stat. 1588 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 379i–379j). These amendments made no alteration, however, to the FDCA’s
definitional section or core provisions governing devices.
91
For instance, the FDA has asserted authority to regulate certain devices useful primarily in law
enforcement. See 21 C.F.R. § 862.3050 (breathalyzer); id. § 866.5800 (rape test kit); id. § 882.1540
(machines sometimes used as lie detectors); Gary E. Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and Medical
Devices: Distinguishing Nonmedical “Devices” from Medical “Devices” Under 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 806, 832 n.165 (1993) (The FDA “declared in a May 1990 Compliance Policy
Guide that kits promoted for the testing of hair for the presence of drugs by employers and law
enforcement officers are unapproved medical devices.”); id. at 853–54 (elaborating on devices used in
such contexts); see also id. at 811–12 & n.34, 832–36 (questioning the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction
over merely assistive devices intended for use by persons with disabilities); id. at 815 (“Because most of
the [device classification] regulations have gone unnoticed and unchallenged, their validity is untested.”);
id. at 824 & n.117 (same); cf. Matthew Avery & Makenzi Galvan, Animal-Based Medical Diagnostics:
A Regulatory Problem, 75 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 370, 397–99 (2020) (explaining that the FDA has classified
maggots and leeches as devices when used for wound healing, and forecasting that it will do the same
with disease-sniffing dogs); Rebecca Robbins, Will Akili’s Prescription Video Game Be a Winner?, BOS.
GLOBE, June 25, 2020, at C1 (reporting that the FDA cleared the online game EndeavorRx for use in
children with ADHD). The FDA reconsidered its position with regard to at least one assistive device,
deciding that NHTSA enjoyed primary jurisdiction instead. See Physical Medicine Devices; Revocation
of the Classification of Mechanical Automobile Hand and Foot Driving Control, 58 Fed. Reg. 29,535
(May 21, 1993).
92
See, e.g., United States v. Undetermined Number of Unlabeled Cases, 21 F.3d 1026, 1028–29
(10th Cir. 1994) (empty glass specimen containers used to transport saliva or urine to a clinical laboratory
to conduct testing solely for insurance underwriting purposes); United States v. Article of Device, 731
F.2d 1253, 1255–58 (7th Cir. 1984) (chiropractic instrument that supposedly detected low levels of
electromagnetic radiation emanating from the body); United States v. 23, More or Less, Articles, 192
F.2d 308, 309 (2d Cir. 1951) (phonograph record purporting to induce sleep); see also United States v.
25 Cases, More or Less, of an Article of Device, 942 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The FDA has
consistently interpreted ‘device’ in a very expansive manner.”); cf. Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass’n
v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 943–46 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal for lack of finality challenges to
FDA warning letters that had treated homeopathic “ear candles” as devices).
93
See Medical Devices; Classification of 70 Electromedical Devices, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,436, 48,440
(Nov. 20, 1990) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. § 878.4635). The FDA had separately classified UV
lamps used for treating dermatological conditions. See General and Plastic Surgery Devices; General
Provisions and Classifications of 51 Devices, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,856, 23,876 (June 24, 1988) (codified as
amended at 21 C.F.R. § 878.4630). The agency enjoys distinct authority over radiation-emitting
electronic products. See Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-602, 82
Stat. 1173 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360hh–360ss).
94
See infra notes 137–38.
95
See 21 C.F.R. § 880.5570(a) (“A hypodermic single lumen needle is a device intended to inject
fluids into, or withdraw fluids from, parts of the body below the surface of the skin.”); cf. id. § 812.3(k)
(distinguishing between “noninvasive” and invasive diagnostic devices based on whether they “by design

2022]

TIME TO BITE THE BULLET?

807

The fact that most guns never get fired (serving only as a threat) should
present no obstacle. After all, courts have rejected the argument that a
product incapable of actually doing what it claims would escape device
jurisdiction.96 Consider in this respect automated external defibrillators
(AEDs), which plainly qualify as (therapeutic) devices.97 Although now
fairly ubiquitous in public places,98 these resuscitation devices rarely, if ever,
get used for treating ventricular fibrillation.99 AEDs may, of course, get
discharged periodically as part of routine maintenance checks or when
training individuals how to use them, which might be viewed as akin to
target practice. The FDA also has authorized the sale of these devices for
home use,100 but in practice this appears to serve as little more than a security
blanket given the even lower likelihood of use in this setting.101
If the relative infrequency of use for wounding presented an obstacle to
asserting device jurisdiction over firearms, then the agency could focus
instead on ammunition as satisfying the structure-or-function clause of the
definition and treat guns as accessories to such devices, designed as systems
for delivering the ammunition.102 After all, an unloaded firearm could not
affect the structure or function of anyone’s body, unless used for purposes

or intention . . . [p]enetrate or pierce the skin or mucous membranes of the body,” though “simple
venipuncture is considered noninvasive”). The agency also has treated instruments used to pierce ears as
devices. See FDA, Compliance Policy Guide § 320.100 (1987), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-infor
mation/search-fda-guidance-documents/cpg-sec-320100-ear-piercing-devices; see also Studex Ear
Piercing Guns, 510(k) Premarket Notification (1986), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cf
docs/cfPMN/pmn.cfm? ID=K860622.
96
See, e.g., United States v. Bowen, 172 F.3d 682, 686 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he only question . . . is
whether the intended use of the product is to prevent disease, not whether the product actually prevents
disease.”); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that
a Scientology “E-meter” was a device, even though the plaintiff admitted that “the devices are ineffective
for any medical therapeutic purpose”); see also Peter Barton Hutt, A History of Government Regulation
of Adulteration and Misbranding of Medical Devices, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 99, 105 (1989)
(explaining that Congress had added the device definition in 1938 to ensure that the FDA could act
against quack devices).
97
See 21 C.F.R. § 870.5310 (2020).
98
See, e.g., Lars Noah, Turn the Beat Around?: Deactivating Implanted Cardiac-Assist Devices,
39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1229, 1234 & n.21 (2013).
99
See Dianne L. Atkins, Editorial, Public Access Defibrillation: Where Does It Work?, 120
CIRCULATION 461 (2009). In this sense, they have become a bit like fire extinguishers.
100
See Barnaby J. Feder, Do It Yourself: The Home Heart Defibrillator, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2005,
at C1.
101
See Gust H. Bardy et al., Home Use of Automated External Defibrillators for Sudden Cardiac
Arrest, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1793, 1802 (2008) (“[T]he low event rate and the neutral outcome with
respect to death from any cause suggest that the placement of AEDs in homes would be an inefficient
strategy in public health terms, despite the value to patients who are fortunate enough to have the event
witnessed and the AED applied.”).
102
A similar debate has arisen in public health circles over whether to characterize the gun as an
injurious “agent” or instead as a “vector” (akin to a mosquito) that transmits the immediately injurious
“agent” (namely, ammunition). See Smith et al., supra note 19, at 585 (“Regardless of how the model is
applied, its value lies in the articulation of a broad range of proximal and distal contributing factors that
provide potential leverage at multiple levels to achieve injury prevention goals.”); see also Peter
Applebome, Conversations/David Satcher; CDC’s New Chief Worries as Much About Bullets as About
Bacteria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1993, at A7.
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of inflicting blunt trauma, while bullets that enter “the body of man or other
animals” plainly intend to affect its structure or function.
Guns come in all shapes and sizes—from toys that shoot foam
projectiles or water,103 and equipment used in athletic competitions such as
starter guns or pistols and rifles fired at targets, to a variety of long guns used
primarily for hunting and handguns designed largely for personal protection.
Technological improvements that initially focused on military and law
enforcement uses quickly spread into the civilian market—thus, among
handguns, semiautomatic pistols have taken the place of revolvers, and
self-loading features have become the norm among long guns as well.104 Of
course, sellers of toy guns do not intend to affect the structure or function of
the body, even if some of these products (i.e., BB and paintball guns) may
cause eye injuries or worse.105 If accidental harms sufficed to trigger device
jurisdiction, then the FDA implausibly could regulate all manner of
potentially injurious consumer goods such as lawn mowers and toasters. In
short, the statutory term “intended” must represent an antonym of
inadvertent. Similarly, pistols that fire blanks or high-powered air guns that
fire pellets for use in marksmen competitions (e.g., biathlon) need not detain
us. Shotguns and the like used primarily for hunting would, however, fit the
definition of device insofar as their intended use is to affect the structure or
function of the body of animals.
Weapons and ammunition designed to inflict wounding force on humans
even more clearly satisfy the structure or function clause. Responsible users
will, of course, train to use these guns at shooting ranges, and they will hope
to never actually fire them at another person;106 similarly, irresponsible users
may brandish weapons solely to threaten others without planning to
discharge them. None of this changes the fact that manufacturers have
designed such products to cause bodily harm and that guns accomplish this
purpose with great regularity.107 Relatively inexpensive small caliber
103

See Esther B. Fein, Violent Playthings: Parents Ponder Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1993,

at B1.
104
See James B. Jacobs, Why Ban “Assault Weapons”?, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 681, 686 (2015)
(“Practically all modern rifles, pistols, and shotguns are semiautomatics; non-semiautomatic long guns
include bolt action, slide action, and breach loaders; non-semiautomatic pistols [nowadays] are called
revolvers.”); C.J. Chivers, The Tools of Modern Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2016, at A12 (discussing
the Cold War origins of the Russian AK-47 and the American AR-15/M-16 rifles); Ali Watkins et al.,
Once Banned, “America’s Rifle” Is Fiercely Loved and Loathed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2018, at A1
(discussing the growing popularity of semiautomatic versions of the AR-15).
105
See Margaret Jones et al., Nonpowder Firearm Injuries to Children Treated in Emergency
Departments, 144 PEDIATRICS e20192739 (2019); Sabrina K. Presnell, Comment, Federal Regulation of
BB Guns: Aiming to Protect Our Children, 80 N.C. L. REV. 975, 979–91, 1002–28 (2002) (discussing
the increasing power of such guns and accumulating evidence of serious harm, concluding that the CPSC
should regulate these products more aggressively).
106
Cf. David Hemenway & Sara J. Solnick, The Epidemiology of Self-Defense Gun Use: Evidence
from the National Crime Victimization Surveys 2007–2011, 79 PREVENTIVE MED. 22, 25 (2015)
(“Self-defense gun use is a rare event.”).
107
See Andrew Jay McClurg, In Search of the Golden Mean in the Gun Debate, 58 HOW. L.J. 779,
798 n.112 (2015) (“[G]uns, at least handguns, are the only legal product for which the intended purpose

2022]

TIME TO BITE THE BULLET?

809

handguns lack any utility for hunting or target shooting, while newer
firearms include various features such as increased caliber size for the sole
purpose of making them still more lethal.108 The FDA could, however, also
assert device jurisdiction over nonlethal weapons, such as stun guns,109 and
nonpenetrating ammunition, such as rubber bullets.110
When gunshot victims assert products liability claims against
manufacturers, the defendants invariably respond by pointing out that their
weapons performed exactly as designed.111 Moreover, the marketing of

and primary utility is to kill or injure human beings. Thus, comparisons to other dangerous products, such
as automobiles, alcohol, or baseball bats, are inapt because their primary purposes and utilities are,
respectively, transportation, recreation, and the national pastime.”); Vernick & Teret, supra note 14, at
1194 (“[F]irearms are specifically designed to injure or kill.”); Michael S. Obermeier, Comment, Scoping
out the Limits of “Arms” Under the Second Amendment, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 681, 701 (2012) (“All
weapons are dangerous. If a particular weapon was not dangerous, then there would be little use for it in
the first place.”); Eliza Sydnor Romm, Opinion, Gun Makers Must Do More, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2018,
at A23 (“[G]un manufacturers . . . create products designed to kill human beings.”).
108
See Smith et al., supra note 19, at 589 (finding “a large increase, especially since 2005, in the
share of firearms produced that are of higher caliber and therefore greater lethality”).
109
See Cheryl W. Thompson & Mark Berman, Stun Guns: “There Was Just Too Much Use,”
WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2015, at A1 (“Tasers are best known for their ability to incapacitate individuals
while used in ‘probe mode,’ when they fire two barbs that deliver an electric current along wires, causing
the muscles to lock up. When placed against a person’s body in ‘drive stun’ mode, . . . Tasers do not
incapacitate but cause localized pain that can be used to control dangerous individuals.”). Although they
do not qualify as firearms (lacking both gun powder and wounding projectiles), stun guns—also known
as “conducted electrical devices” (or “electroshock weapons”)—operate in a fashion vaguely similar to
AEDs, see supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text, though obviously without intending to serve any
sort of therapeutic purpose. Nonetheless, an instrument designed to discharge enough voltage to inflict
pain or trigger momentary muscle paralysis plainly would satisfy the structure-or-function clause; after
all, the agency has regulated as devices other products that resemble cattle prods. See Judge Rotenberg
Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. FDA, 3 F.4th 390, 396–40 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (invalidating the agency’s ban on electrical
stimulation devices to treat aggressive or self-injurious behavior); see also United States v. Universal
Mgmt. Servs., 191 F.3d 750, 754–55 (6th Cir. 1999) (sustaining an FDA enforcement action against the
seller of electric gas grill igniters marketed for analgesic purposes). If the FDA preferred an incremental
approach, then it could start by tackling stun guns notwithstanding the lack of carnage associated with
such weapons. Cf. Kate Mather, Trouble with Tasers; One of the LAPD’s Preferred Weapons to Help
Officers Avoid Shootings Often Doesn’t Work, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2016, at A1; supra note 58
(referencing jurisdictional jockeying by the CPSC and the ATF over early versions of the Taser); infra
note 230 and accompanying text (explaining that in 2016 the U.S. Supreme Court extended Second
Amendment protection to stun guns).
110
See Knvul Sheikh & David Montgomery, It’s “Nonlethal,” but It Maims, and Also Kills, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2020, at A1 (“Rubber bullets, one of the most common crowd-control munitions, are
more than four times the diameter of typical bullets and weigh more than five times as much. They are
usually fired from military grenade launchers . . . . Since they are cylinder-shaped, without the pointy
tips of regular bullets, they are not designed to penetrate the body.”); id. (“A 2017 analysis published in
the British Medical Journal of several decades of the use of rubber bullets, beanbag rounds and other
projectiles during arrests and protests found that 15 percent of people who were injured were left with
permanent disabilities and 3 percent of those who were injured died.”).
111
See, e.g., Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1158 (Md. 2002) (rejecting a design
defect claim against the manufacturer of a semiautomatic pistol because “it worked exactly as it was
designed and intended to work and as any ordinary consumer would have expected it to work”); id. at
1153 (pointing out that “a handgun does not malfunction when it shoots a bullet into a person in whose
direction it is fired”); see also Timothy D. Lytton, Negligent Marketing: Halberstam v. Daniel and the
Uncertain Future of Negligent Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REV.
681, 682 (1998) (“While well-made firearms that function precisely as designed might be dangerous,
they are not defective.”); Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1912 (1984)
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some firearms and accessories amply confirms this intended use, and sales
to civilians of weapons designed for professionals belie any suggestion of a
function other than the capacity to cause personal injury.113 Outside of
products liability, tort law routinely characterizes firearms as inherently
dangerous instrumentalities, which may have consequences for users’
standard of care and owners’ obligations when entrusting them to others.114
Although at best only a minor facet of the overall problem, exotic
ammunition offers a stark illustration of the broader difficulty. Consider this
advertisement directed to gun enthusiasts:
Officially called the Supreme Expansion Talon, SXT, the
Black Talon represents the latest step up in hollow-point bullet
performance. . . . The Talon expands to expose razor-sharp
reinforced jacket petals. These cut tissue in the wake of the
penetrating core. Toward the end of the bullet travel, the Talon
bullet typically turns sideways. . . . From this point on, it
penetrates soft tissue like a throwing star—very nasty; very
effective; a real improvement in handgun ammo.115
(criticizing attempts “to hold manufacturers liable for making available a product that performs exactly
as it is intended to perform”).
112
See, e.g., Prescott v. Slide Fire Solutions, LP, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1140 (D. Nev. 2019)
(referencing allegations that the defendant had “promoted the bump stock device for its high rate-of-fire
capabilities”); id. at 1129 (“Plaintiffs also point to statements made by Slide Fire’s inventor . . . which
suggest that bump stocks are intended for consumers who seek a firearm that mimics a fully automatic
weapon.”); Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 119–20, 132–33 (Cal. 2001) (discussing efforts to
market the TEC-DC9 in ways designed to appeal to criminals, but ultimately rejecting the tort claims);
id. at 136–39 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (elaborating on the design and marketing of these semiautomatic
pistols and their 32 round detachable magazines); Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, 202 A.3d 262, 325
(Conn. 2019) (allowing only unfair trade practice claims based on allegedly unlawful marketing of the
assault rifle used in the Sandy Hook Elementary School mass shooting).
113
See Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1204 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiffs allege that Glock’s
marketing and distribution strategy includes the purposeful oversupply of guns to police departments and
the provision of unnecessary upgrades and free exchange of guns with police departments to create a
supply of post-police guns that can be sold through unlicensed dealers without background checks to
illegal buyers at a profit.”); Dru Stevenson, Smart Guns, the Law, and the Second Amendment, 124 PENN
ST. L. REV. 691, 716 (2020) (“[G]un makers advertise products to the civilian market as the same guns
used by the Army, Marines, or major urban police departments.”); see also James William Gibson,
Opinion, Guns Today Are Combat-Ready, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2019, at A11 (“[B]uyers find the power
of combat weapons seductive. Paramilitary consumers crave adrenaline, and the weapons are designed
and advertised to appeal to warrior fantasies.”).
114
See, e.g., Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200, 1206–08 (Fla. 1997); Wood v. Groh, 7 P.3d
1163, 1168–69 (Kan. 2000); Est. of Strever v. Cline, 924 P.2d 666, 671 (Mont. 1996); Herland v. Izatt,
345 P.3d 661, 666–68, 672–75 (Utah 2015).
115
Bull of a Bullet, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 17, 1993, at A2 (quoting from the November 1992 issue
of Handguns for Sport & Defense); see also Ronald Smothers, A Tax Debate Focuses on Destruction
Science, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1993 (§ 1), at 22 (“Marketed under names like Black Talon, Starfire and
Hydro-Shok, the ammunition is touted in the advertising for its ‘unsurpassed stopping power’ and its
‘knockdown power.’ Those attributes have made it popular with handgun owners who say their main
reason for keeping a weapon is self-defense rather than target practice or hunting.”). Manufacturers of
other exotic types of ammunition have engaged in similar types of marketing:
Distributors advertise their wares with a variety of lethal claims. In most states, it is
possible to mail-order Blammo Ammo, which explodes upon impact into hundreds of

2022]

TIME TO BITE THE BULLET?

811

By not exiting their intended target, barbed hollow-point bullets work to
limit risks to bystanders. Nonetheless, after the Black Talon ammunition
featured in a pair of mass shootings in 1993,116 physicians began expressing
alarm about removing such sharp projectiles from the mangled viscera of
victims.117 A prominent member of the U.S. Senate proposed taxing this
class of ammunition into oblivion, 118 and some commentators advocated
imposing direct restrictions on the sale of bullets more generally.119
Although these proposals never gained traction, and products liability claims

small shards—“naturally, life threatening trauma and shock occur immediately.” The
Bolo delivers little balls, connected by piano wire, that whirl around inside—“it slices,
it dices.” Dragon’s Breath ignites miniature magnesium fireballs—“also known as the
three-second flamethrower. . . . Will not harm your shotgun barrel.”
Judy Pasternak, Taking Aim at Exotic Bullets, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1994, at A1.
116
See Robert Gunnison & Susan Sward, Highrise Killer Used Mushrooming Bullets in Attack, S.F.
CHRON., July 13, 1993, at A17; Jonathan Rabinovitz, Sadness and Hope for Family of Victims of Train
Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at B5.
117
See Rene Sanchez, Brutal Message in Bullet’s Hollow Point; Growing Use of Black Talon
Ammunition Causes Alarm in D.C., WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1994, at D1 (“[S]ome medical groups have
complained that the Black Talon’s sharp, curling edges pose risks during surgery because they are more
likely to tear a surgeon’s gloves and expose the surgeon and victim to infection during an attempt to
remove the bullet.”).
118
See Adam Clymer, Moynihan Asks Big Tax Increase on Ammunition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1993,
at A1 (reporting that the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee advocated an increase in the excise
tax to 10,000%); see also id. (“Mr. Moynihan’s proposal would raise the current 11 percent tax on the
wholesale price of handgun ammunition to 50 percent in most [other] cases. It would not raise the tax on
.22-caliber ammunition typically used for target shooting.”); Scott D. Dailard, The Role of Ammunition
in a Balanced Program of Gun Control: A Critique of the Moynihan Bullet Bills, 20 J. LEGIS. 19, 23 n.31
(1994) (noting that the proposal to increase the excise tax to 50% on centerfire ammunition with a
cartridge case shorter than 1.3 inches would reach all ammunition used for handguns, apart from the .22
caliber rimfire type preferred for target shooting and sports competition, while entirely excluding rifles);
cf. id. at 24–34 (discussing shortcomings in related proposals to prohibit the sale of a more limited subset
of handgun ammunition, doubting that this underinclusive approach would quickly render such firearms
obsolete). Senator Moynihan’s proposed massive tax hike on the 9 mm Black Talon cartridge also would
have applied to .50 caliber “Desert Eagle” ammunition. See id. at 23, 27; see also Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, Opinion, Guns Don’t Kill People. Bullets Do., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1993 (§ 4), at 15.
119
See Katherine Kaufer Christoffel, Toward Reducing Pediatric Injuries from Firearms: Charting
a Legislative and Regulatory Course, 88 PEDIATRICS 294, 300 (1991) (“Because ammunition is a
consumable product, modification of ammunition may have more promise as a rapid means to reduce the
severity of injuries from firearms than modification of the weapons themselves.”); id. at 301 (“The
destructiveness of available bullets could be reduced by regulating the amount of gunpowder, the shape
of the tip, and/or jacketing. Such regulation might reduce the severity of nonfatal injury fairly quickly.”);
Brendan J. Healey, Plugging the Bullet Holes in U.S. Gun Law: An Ammunition-Based Proposal for
Tightening Gun Control, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 18–34 (1998) (proposing to require background
checks and recordkeeping for the purchase of ammunition and stricter licensing of dealers); Scott Shuger,
Opinion, A Prescription for Ammo; Why Are Killer Bullets as Easy to Buy as Aspirin?, WASH. POST,
Dec. 26, 1993, at C1 (“Let’s treat handgun bullets as a controlled substance.”); see also supra note 73
(referencing other proposals to limit ammo); cf. Michael Corkery, Walmart Enters Gun Debate,
Curtailing Ammunition Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2019, at A1.
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120

against the Black Talon manufacturer failed, the company decided to
cease selling these bullets to civilians.121
Even entirely mundane types of ammunition merit closer scrutiny.
Higher muzzle velocities and higher energy rounds cause greater tissue
damage that surgeons may then find harder to isolate.122 Moreover, the vast
majority of the billions of bullets produced every year contain lead.123 Unlike
copper, lead evidently “helps bullets maintain consistent trajectories . . .
[and] ensures maximum damage when a target is hit.”124 Apart from their
greater potential for causing lethal injury, such bullets may become lodged
in the body of survivors and later cause dangerous lead poisoning.125 Thus,
even though they represent the very antithesis of therapeutic products, guns
and ammunition literally fit within the FDA’s regulatory jurisdiction over
devices because these products unmistakably intend to affect the structure
or function of the body.126
120
See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 154–57 (2d Cir. 1997); Leslie v. United States,
986 F. Supp. 900, 909–13 (D.N.J. 1997), aff’d mem., 178 F.3d 1279 (3d Cir. 1999); Downs v. R.T.S.
Sec., Inc., 670 So. 2d 434, 439 (La. Ct. App. 1996). As with the unsuccessful products liability claims
brought against gun manufacturers, these courts held that the ammunition had functioned precisely as
intended. See, e.g., McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 155.
121
See Ronald Smothers, Manufacturer to Withdraw Controversial Ammunition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 1993, at B9 (adding, however, that “there are still 20 to 25 other types of high-performance handgun
ammunition of similar type on the market”); see also Lethal New Ammunition Penetrates a Federal Ban,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1994, at A10 (reporting on “plans to market two types of destructive handgun
ammunition that escape a Federal ban on such fragmenting rounds because they are made of carbon-based
plastics called polymers, rather than metal. . . . [T]he bullets break into thousands of razorlike fragments
when they strike human flesh, the fragments becoming lethal shrapnel . . . .”); id. (“As deadly as hollow
points [such as Black Talon and its still marketed imitators] can be, they pale in comparison to the new
[Rhino] ammunition because a much larger proportion of it fragments upon impact.”).
122
See AMA Council Sci. Affs., Assault Weapons as a Public Health Hazard in the United States,
267 JAMA 3067, 3068 (1992) (“High-velocity bullets may set up shock waves and cause cavitation
effects, resulting in unpredictable damage at sites far from the wound tract.”); Daniel W. Webster et al.,
Epidemiologic Changes in Gunshot Wounds in Washington, DC, 1983–1990, 127 ARCHIVES SURGERY
694, 697–98 (1992) (suggesting that a shift in weaponry toward high-capacity, semiautomatic handguns
accounted for the increase in patients presenting with multiple thoracic wounds); Margot Sanger-Katz &
Quoctrung Bui, “Type of Weapon Matters”: Linking Caliber Size to Death Rate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2019, at A16 (“Over recent decades, the size of bullets fired by the typical handgun has increased.
Changes in design have made it easier to fire big [and more lethal] bullets from concealable weapons,
and manufacturers have marketed more powerful [semiautomatic] guns as better tools for self-defense.”);
see also id. (“There are no serious current proposals to regulate or limit the sale of handguns by caliber
size.”). For the classic reference volume on different types of ammunition, see FRANK C. BARNES,
CARTRIDGES OF THE WORLD (W. Todd Woodward ed., 16th ed. 2019).
123
See Melissa Chan, The Poison in Their Blood: They Survived Mass Shootings, but the Bullets
Could Still Kill Them, TIME, July 8, 2019, at 40, 42 (“Of the 9 billion ammunition rounds produced in
the U.S. or imported into the country each year, 95% contain lead, according to the National Shooting
Sports Foundation, a gun trade group.”).
124
Id.
125
See id. at 40 (discussing “a lesser-known side effect of gun violence: lead poisoning” caused by
unremoved bullet fragments); see also Debora Weiss et al., Elevated Blood Lead Levels Associated with
Retained Bullet Fragments—United States, 2003–2012, 66 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 130,
130 (2017) (calling it “an infrequently reported, but important, cause of lead toxicity; symptoms are often
nonspecific and can appear years after suffering a gunshot wound”); cf. supra note 57 (discussing limited
efforts to address environmental contamination caused by lead shot used when hunting).
126
See Gamerman, supra note 91, at 834 n.177 (conceding that “manufacturers [of guns] plainly
intend that their products affect a function of the body”).
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D. Applying the Tools Used for Device Regulation
The FDA enjoys a range of powers over sellers of devices, and it can
use these to promote technological changes that enhance safety and to inhibit
those that make products more hazardous. The various statutory provisions
governing devices provide flexible options for sensibly controlling the
production and sale of guns and ammunition, including measures such as
imposing a minimum age for purchasing any type of firearm from any class
of seller, demanding clearer instructions related to conscientious use and
storage, mandating the adoption of magazine disconnects and other risk
reduction features, and altogether prohibiting particularly hazardous classes
of guns, ammunition, or other accessories.
It violates federal law to sell an “adulterated” or “misbranded” device.127
Adulteration relates primarily to flaws in the process of manufacturing,128
while misbranding connotes some shortcoming in labeling,129 but the FDCA
enumerates several more particular ways that a seller might violate each of
these prohibitions. For instance, it would misbrand a device to make false or
misleading claims about its performance or fail to reveal dangers associated
with its use.130 Similarly, if a device must abide by a performance standard
or requires the filing of an application for premarket approval, the failure by
the seller to do so would render the product adulterated.131
Devices introduced before May 28, 1976, or that are “substantially
equivalent” to devices marketed before that date, may remain on the market.
Class III devices, defined to include those products that pose “a potential
unreasonable risk of illness or injury,”132 may take advantage of this
abbreviated route to market until the FDA issues a regulation that requires
the filing of an application for premarket approval (PMA) for a particular
type of device. A person wishing to introduce a new device but asserting that
it qualifies as substantially equivalent to a previously marketed (a.k.a.
predicate) device must file a premarket notification (PMN) under § 510(k)
of the FDCA to advise the agency.133 The PMN must demonstrate that the
device has the same intended use and that any changes in its technological
characteristics would raise no new safety or effectiveness questions.134 This
127

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a)–(c), 351–352 (2018).
See id. § 351(a); see also United States v. 789 Cases, More or Less, of Latex Surgeons’ Gloves,
an Article of Device, 799 F. Supp. 1275, 1285–94 (D.P.R. 1992).
129
See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a); 21 C.F.R. pt. 801 (2020).
130
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(n), 352(a)(1), 352(f); see also United States v. Two Units, More or Less,
of an Article or Device, Consisting of a Power Unit & a Chair, 49 F.3d 479, 482 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. An Article of Device . . . “Toftness Radiation Detector,” 731 F.2d 1253, 1259 (7th Cir. 1984)
(“[T]he device has to work⎯if it does not work, it is misbranded.”); United States v. One Device,
Intended for Use as a Colonic Irrigator, 160 F.2d 194, 200 (10th Cir. 1947) (sustaining misbranding
action against the “tox-eliminator”).
131
See 21 U.S.C. § 351(e), (f)(1).
132
Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(II).
133
See id. § 360(k); 21 C.F.R. pt. 807(E).
134
See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i); 21 C.F.R. § 807.100; see also Cytori Therapeutics, Inc. v. FDA, 715
F.3d 922, 927–28 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
128
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has become the primary mechanism for FDA review of new devices,135 but,
unlike the far more rigorous PMA process, it does not provide any real
assessment of product safety and effectiveness.136
If devices need not (yet) secure full approval, the FDA may impose
“special controls” such as postmarket surveillance duties or performance
standards.137 In addition, the agency can designate devices as “restricted” in
order to limit their distribution, 138 which would also give it the power to
regulate any advertising for such products.139 If a device presents “an
unreasonable risk of substantial harm to public health,” the FDA may require
notification of this hazard to device users and others.140 The agency can ban
particularly hazardous devices,141 which it has done just a handful of
times,142 though a call for the filing of PMAs for a device can accomplish
the same thing.143 If it chose to do so for firearms, then manufacturers would
find it difficult to demonstrate the safety of their products.
Device sellers must register with the FDA and face periodic inspections
of their facilities and records.144 Sellers also must submit reports of bad
outcomes experienced with certain devices.145 If necessitated by newly
135
See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 317 (2008) (“Most new Class III devices enter the
market through § 510(k). In 2005, for example, the FDA authorized the marketing of 3,148 devices under
§ 510(k) and granted premarket approval to just 32 devices.”).
136
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478–80, 493–94 (1996).
137
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351(e), 360c(a), 360d(a), 360l; 21 C.F.R. pts. 822, 861; see also General and
Plastic Surgery Devices: Reclassification of Ultraviolet Lamps for Tanning, Henceforth to Be Known as
Sunlamp Products and Ultraviolet Lamps Intended for Use in Sunlamp Products, 79 Fed. Reg. 31,205,
31,213–14 (June 2, 2014) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 878.4635) (moving sunlamps and related equipment
used for indoor tanning from Class I to Class II and imposing as special controls disclosure requirements
to caution against underage usage and warn of risks). For an example of a performance standard, see 21
C.F.R. pt. 898 (implanted leads). Although the statute called for such special controls only in connection
with Class II devices, the FDA could make them applicable to Class III devices not yet subject to PMA
requirements as well. See infra note 143.
138
See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e); see also General and Plastic Surgery Devices: Restricted Sale,
Distribution, and Use of Sunlamp Products, 80 Fed. Reg. 79,493, 79,503–05 (Dec. 22, 2015) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 878.4635) (proposing to use this authority in order to ban all use of tanning beds
by minors and require that adults first sign a risk acknowledgment form).
139
See 21 U.S.C. § 352(q)–(r). Otherwise, the FTC exercises authority over device advertising. See
15 U.S.C. § 52 (2018); see also FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 862–64 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming
judgment for the Commission on charges that analgesic claims in advertising for an “ionized” brass
bracelet lacked substantiation).
140
See 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a)(1)–(2).
141
See id. § 360e(e).
142
See 21 C.F.R. pt. 895(B) (listing only prosthetic hair fibers, powdered medical gloves, and
electrical stimulation devices for self-injurious or aggressive behavior).
143
See Duff Wilson, F.D.A. Panel Is Split on Electroshock Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, at B7
(reporting about fears that electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) may disappear if the agency demands that
manufacturers of these devices secure PMAs); see also Neurological Devices; Reclassification of
Electroconvulsive Therapy Devices; Effective Date of Requirement for Premarket Approval for
Electroconvulsive Therapy Devices for Certain Specified Intended Uses, 83 Fed. Reg. 66,103, 66,123–
24 (Dec. 26, 2018) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 882.5940) (finessing this concern by reclassifying ECT
devices for only a limited set of uses and calling for the submission of PMNs to demonstrate adherence
to newly issued special controls).
144
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(h)(2), 374(a), 374(e); In re Establishment Inspection of Medtronic, Inc.,
500 F. Supp. 536, 538–40 (D. Minn. 1980).
145
See 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a); 21 C.F.R. pt. 803; United States v. Laerdal Mfg. Corp., 73 F.3d 852,
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discovered hazards, the agency can order the recall of a device. The FDA
also can require that sellers track devices in order to facilitate such forms of
postmarket surveillance and corrective action.147
The violation of any of these requirements would allow the FDA to
pursue a variety of enforcement actions. It could impose an administrative
detention order or civil fines,148 subject to judicial review, or it could initiate
prosecution in the federal courts seeking an order condemning any seized
inventory of the product,149 broad forms of injunctive relief,150 or even
criminal sanctions.151 In short, unlike the ATF’s fairly tepid requirements
and limited enforcement powers, the FDA’s assertion of device jurisdiction
would confront the firearms industry with a powerful regulatory body.
Conversely, if the FDA imposed specific requirements on sellers of guns and
ammunition, then it likely would preempt state and local laws addressing the
same subjects.152
As it did in the case of tobacco products, however, the agency could opt
to use only a subset of its possible device powers, and it might prefer a
reactive rather than proactive stance initially—for instance, responding to
any dangerous malfunctions by ordering a recall. Basic recordkeeping and
reporting requirements would allow it to learn more about what sorts of
issues require vigilance. The agency could mandate that purchasers receive
instructions and safe storage recommendations. It might designate some or
all of these products as restricted devices, which would allow the FDA to
impose various conditions on their sale: age restrictions, quantity limits,
screening purchasers more carefully than done under existing background
855–56 (9th Cir. 1995).
146
See 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e); 21 C.F.R. pt. 810.
147
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360i(e), 360j(j); 21 C.F.R. pt. 821.
148
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 333(f), 334(g); 21 C.F.R. § 800.55.
149
See 21 U.S.C. § 334(a); United States v. 789 Cases, More or Less, of Latex Surgeons’ Gloves,
an Article of Device, 799 F. Supp. 1275, 1295–98 (D.P.R. 1992); United States v. An Article . . . Acu-dot,
483 F. Supp. 1311, 1316–17 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
150
See 21 U.S.C. § 332(a); United States v. Diapulse Corp., 457 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1972)
(affirming an injunction against the continued marketing of misbranded devices); see also United States
v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 761–64 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming an equitable order of
restitution to purchasers of an adulterated device).
151
See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a); see also United States v. Caputo, 456 F. Supp. 2d 970, 982–83, 985
(N.D. Ill. 2006) (ordering several years in jail for two officers of a small company that had violated
numerous FDCA provisions in the course of selling a sterilizer for surgical instruments), aff’d in relevant
part, 517 F.3d 935, 940–43 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Torigian Labs., Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1514,
1517 (E.D.N.Y.) (involving a criminal conviction for device adulteration and misbranding), aff’d mem.,
751 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1984).
152
See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a); see also Comm. of Dental Amalgam Mfrs. v. Stratton, 92 F.3d 807,
813 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the FDA’s general requirements governing fillings for cavities did not
preempt a state warning requirement); METX, LLC v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC, 62 F. Supp. 3d 569,
573 (E.D. Tex. 2014) (holding that federal hearing aid requirements preempted more restrictive state
rules related to dispensing). States can apply for waivers. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b); 21 C.F.R. pt. 808. An
FDA assertion of device jurisdiction also might provide the basis for a preemption defense to tort claims
depending on the rigor of controls it then chose to impose, see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312,
323–25 (2008), but that would matter little as Congress already has granted the firearms industry fairly
sweeping immunity, see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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checks, or authorizing their distribution only to law enforcement or military
agencies. Under its authority to require device tracking, the agency could
collect detailed information about where firearms and ammunition end up.153
Under its authority to require unique device identifiers,154 the FDA might
demand tamper-resistant serial numbers on weapons as well as bullets.155
If the agency sought to drive more ambitious modifications in product
designs, then it could promulgate performance standards, perhaps akin to
those adopted in Massachusetts.156 Standards could address problems such
as the ease of gun use by children,157 unauthorized use by adults,158 and
semiautomatic weapons firing even after the removal of the magazine,159 and
153
For more on the potential benefits of systematically collecting such information, see Philip J.
Cook & Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic and Investigative Uses of New
Data on Firearms Markets, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 277 (2001).
154
See 21 U.S.C. § 360i(f); 21 C.F.R. pts. 801(B), 830. This represents one of the few operative
provisions of the FDCA, however, that refers more narrowly to “medical devices,” which suggests that
it would have no application to guns and ammunition.
155
Cf. Hemenway, supra note 14, at 652 (“The regulatory agency should have the power to ensure
that every gun has a unique identifier, that the serial number is virtually impossible to obliterate and that
bullets can be readily traced to a particular gun.”). Federal law already requires serial numbers on
firearms but does not dictate tamper-resistance. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k), 923(i) (2018); 27 C.F.R.
§§ 478.92(a)(1)(i), 479.102(a)(1) (2020) (requiring only that a “serial number must be placed in a manner
not susceptible of being readily obliterated, altered, or removed,” though more recently specifying a
minimum depth of engraving); Identification Markings Placed on Firearms, 66 Fed. Reg. 40,596, 40,599
(Aug. 3, 2001) (conceding “that all markings can be removed by someone who wishes to make a
deliberate effort to remove the markings,” focusing instead on the tendency to wear off from normal
handling); see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 93–101 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting Second
Amendment challenge to a conviction for possession of a handgun with an obliterated serial number). In
responding to the opioid crisis, the FDA similarly encouraged drug manufacturers to introduce
abuse-resistant formulations of their prescription narcotics. See Noah, supra note 30, at 771.
156
See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also Butkus et al., supra note 28, at 706 (“The
American College of Physicians recommends that guns be subject to consumer product regulations
regarding access, safety, and design.”); John S. Milne et al., Effect of Current Federal Regulations on
Handgun Safety Features, 41 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 1, 9 (2003) (“It might be possible . . . to
develop effective performance-based handgun safety standards, similar to the safety standards for
automobiles, that could result in a significant decrease in firearm-related injuries.”); id. at 5–7 (discussing
the use of features such as a grip safety, firing pin block, loaded chamber indicator, and magazine safety).
157
Cf. Hemenway, supra note 14, at 652 (“The agency should have the power to require safety and
crime detection measures for all firearms manufactured or sold in the United States. For example, guns
should not fire when dropped and should be made child-proof (a toddler should not be able to fire any
gun).”). Some newer handguns have become easier for a child to fire. See Jeff Leen, Weapon of
“Simplicity” Finds Success, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1998, at A23 (reporting that the popular Glock
semiautomatic pistols have “light triggers,” which means that it takes half the normal force to fire the
first round).
158
Cf. Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Principles for Effective Gun Policy, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
589, 612 (2004) (“While trigger locks are widely distributed and would be sufficient for this purpose
[namely, guarding against unauthorized use after theft or by children] if they were actually used, an
internal keyed lock is more convenient and hence likely to be more widely used by owners.”); id.
(“Several manufacturers already sell models with internal locks, and Maryland now requires that all new
handguns be equipped with integrated mechanical locking devices.” (footnotes omitted)). “Smart” guns
incorporate biometric security or other technologies. See Stevenson, supra note 113, at 698–718
(discussing types of personalized guns and their limitations); id. at 740 (“It may be worth encouraging
the development of the technology to save a few hundred lives per year, but advocates (and politicians)
should not overpromise what the technology could achieve.”).
159
See Jon S. Vernick et al., “I Didn’t Know the Gun Was Loaded”: An Examination of Two Safety
Devices That Can Reduce the Risk of Unintentional Firearm Injuries, 20 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 427,
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they might even limit muzzle velocity or caliber size. For some of these
concerns, technological fixes already exist, while for others they remain on
the drawing board. The FDA need not dictate particular modifications in
design, but demanding attention to particular problems would put the onus
on the gun industry to come up with feasible solutions. Without performance
standards, however, the prospect of having to secure agency clearance
before marketing novel redesigns might inhibit safety-enhancing innovation
by manufacturers even though the FDA undoubtedly would allow it.
In theory, the premarket review provisions would mean demanding that
sellers of these Class III devices file applications for PMA that demonstrate
their safety and effectiveness; in practice, the FDA would only require that
sellers of new guns and ammunition file PMNs to demonstrate their
substantial equivalence to older models.161 At a minimum, this should block
the introduction of still more dangerous versions,162 while it would allow
technological innovations that enhance product safety. For instance, had the
FDA exercised device jurisdiction over ammunition in 1992, Black Talon
bullets presumably would never have entered the market.
If the agency did not content itself with freezing the state of the art in
this industry, then it could call for the filing of futile PMAs while exempting
certain preferred relatively safer models. If it did not care about subtlety or
shouldering the burden of proof, then the agency could accomplish such an
end even more directly by issuing an order banning certain excessively
hazardous types of guns or accessories such as large-capacity magazines.163
433 (1999) (discussing the initially limited adoption of loaded chamber indicators and magazine safeties
in semiautomatic pistols).
160
See Dailard, supra note 118, at 35 (“Congress might reasonably decide to suppress the
manufacture and sale of the high-velocity, high-energy handgun cartridges that tend to create the most
massive wounds in shooting victims. . . . [S]uch a ban would not be conceived as a restriction on specific
calibers. Instead, Congress would simply determine a maximum threshold or a benchmark of ballistic
performance measured in muzzle energy that no caliber could legally exceed.”); Judith S. Palfrey & Sean
Palfrey, Preventing Gun Deaths in Children, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 401, 403 (2013) (“[T]he tissuedestruction capability of ammunition should be limited.”); Rostron, supra note 52, at 1462 (“If legislators
want to impose tighter restrictions on extremely powerful firearms, they . . . should write laws that look
to the amount of energy a firearm is capable of producing, rather than its caliber. For example, Congress
could pass a measure imposing additional restrictions on firearms capable of achieving muzzle energy
exceeding some specified threshold, such as 10,000 or 12,000 foot-pounds.”); id. at 1465 (“[M]uzzle
energy is an attractive measure because it provides a good gauge of a firearm’s potency without undue
complexity. Muzzle energy may not tell the whole story when it comes to comparing the power of
firearms, but it provides a workable means of making distinctions far more sensible than those based
entirely on caliber.”); see also id. at 1419–28 (distinguishing among various types of firearms, cartridges,
ammunition, calibers, and muzzle velocity); id. at 1436–67 (discussing the debate about .50 caliber sniper
rifles); Gina Kolata & C.J. Chivers, A Clinical View of Assault Rifles and Their “Ghastly” Toll, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2018, at A14 (“The high energy bullet creates a blast wave around the bullet. And the
yaw can contribute to the larger exit wound. Striking bone can also cause bone fragments that radiate
outward, cutting tissue in each fragment’s path.”).
161
See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
162
Cf. Hemenway, supra note 14, at 652 (“The [hypothetical] agency should also have the power
to prevent the introduction into the civilian market of new firearm products that are more lethal, more
concealable, or more conducive to crime than current firearms.”).
163
Cf. Donald L. Flexner, Why the Civilian Purchase, Use, and Sale of Assault Weapons and
Semiautomatic Rifles and Pistols, Along with Large Capacity Magazines, Should Be Banned, 20 N.Y.U.
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Similarly, it could try to force a shift from lead to copper or other less toxic
materials in ammunition. A still more ambitious strategy might seek to put
an end to all sales of semiautomatic pistols to civilians.164 Thus, the assertion
of device jurisdiction over guns and ammunition would offer the FDA a
variety of regulatory options, ranging from reactive to proactive and from
incremental to extreme.165 Political calculations may convince the agency to
start off slowly, reserving its proverbial big guns for only the most egregious
conduct by members of the firearms industry.
II. GOING BALLISTIC? DISARMING A BARRAGE OF RETURN FIRE
Even if the FDA decided to assert device jurisdiction over guns and
ammunition, it would have to count on a skeptical response from all three
branches of government. Without clearance from the White House, any such
agency proposal would never see the light of day. Assuming that the
President decided to play along, Congress would enjoy various opportunities
to squelch the initiative. Lastly, even if the FDA survived these political
checks, adversely affected parties surely would mount a legal challenge,
giving our nominally apolitical judicial branch the last word. Any effort to
regulate guns and ammunition as devices would encounter serious but hardly
insurmountable statutory and constitutional objections in the federal courts.
Long odds, to be sure, but still worth a try.
A. Political Roadblocks and Opportunities
As FDA officials have learned in the last few decades, the leadership at
the cabinet-level department that houses it—namely, Health and Human
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 612–15 (2017); Louis Klarevas et al., The Effect of Large-Capacity
Magazine Bans on High-Fatality Mass Shootings, 1990–2017, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1754, 1761
(2019); Griff Witte, Calls to Restrict Firearm Capacity, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2019, at A1.
164
Cf. Dailard, supra note 118, at 34–35 (“[C]ompared to its auto-loading counterpart, the revolver
is slow and cumbersome to load, difficult to fire rapidly with accuracy, and has an inherently low
ammunition capacity. These features translate to reduced firepower and, thus, to a reduced capacity to
inflict multiple wounds or wound multiple victims.”); Kamin, supra note 29, at 71 (noting “the likely
resistance to implementing another assault weapon ban (or the far greater pushback that could be
expected in opposition to a plan to limit access to semiautomatic handguns)”). Law enforcement
departments have come to rely on semiautomatic weapons. See Ashley Southall, For Final Few Officers,
the Era of the Revolver Is at an End, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2018, at A20 (discussing the transition among
law enforcement personnel to semiautomatic pistols); Watkins et al., supra note 104, at A1 (reporting
that “police departments around the country started making AR-15s standard issue for officers”).
165
Cf. Hemenway, supra note 14, at 652 (“The key point is not to prescribe exactly what the agency
would or should do, but to create such an agency and invest it with the resources and power—including
standard-setting, recall and research capability—for making reasonable decisions about firearms.”).
Although it may lack the full panoply of powers found in the federal version, the uniform state FDCA
uses a parallel definition of devices. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-92(6)(B) (2020); MASS GEN.
LAWS ch. 94, § 1 (2020); see also Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 860–
61 (2017) (discussing widespread adoption but infrequent enforcement of this uniform law). Although
Massachusetts had used entirely different statutory authority to regulate gun manufacturers, see supra
notes 33–36 and accompanying text, this analysis suggests that agencies in other states could assert
device authority if federal action does not materialize. Cf. supra note 152 and accompanying text
(discussing the prospect of federal preemption).
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Services (HHS)—might take issue with the agency’s decisions, perhaps at
the behest of the White House.166 Something like this happened with efforts
to make an emergency contraceptive available without a prescription; in
2011, just one day after the FDA Commissioner had announced approval of
full over-the-counter status, the Secretary of HHS overruled the agency, with
the President soon thereafter publicly expressing his support for the latter
decision.167 After an exhaustive review of what had happened in this case, a
federal district court invalidated the Secretary’s decision, remanding the
case with instructions that the FDA authorize unrestricted marketing.168
Even if the White House chose not to stand in the way, Congress would
get an expedited opportunity to override a major regulation before it could
take effect.169 In 2016, the Social Security Administration promulgated a
rule that would report to the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System certain disability benefit recipients if premised on findings of mental
illness.170 A couple of months later, Congress adopted an override that the
new occupant of the White House signed.171 If a controversial rule got issued
earlier in a Presidential term, then the likelihood of a veto would prevent
such a move unless Congress managed to muster super-majorities in both

166
See Sheila Kaplan, Health Chief Forbids Agencies Like F.D.A. to Issue Rules on Their Own,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2020, at A4 (calling a memorandum issued by HHS Secretary Azar that evidently
was designed to rein in rulemaking initiatives by the FDA “a stunning declaration of authority”); see also
Noah Weiland, How the C.D.C. Lost Its Voice Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2020, at A8
(“[P]olitical appointees at the health department repeatedly asked C.D.C. officials to revise, delay and
even scuttle drafts they thought could be viewed, by implication, as criticism of President Trump.”).
167
See Rob Stein, Judge Rejects Plan B Challenge, May Review FDA Decision, WASH. POST, Dec.
14, 2011, at A2 (“[I]n an unprecedented decision, [HHS Secretary Kathleen] Sebelius overruled [FDA
Commissioner Margaret] Hamburg . . . , a decision endorsed the next day by President Obama.”); see
also Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA’s Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 927,
961 (2014) (explaining that “Obama himself disclaimed involvement (though he was quick to affirm
support for Sebelius’s overruling of the FDA in 2011)”); Gardiner Harris, White House and the F.D.A.
Often at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2012, at A1 (discussing this and similar incidents during Obama’s
first term). Obama’s successor in office perfected this technique. See, e.g., Sharon LaFraniere et al., Stung
by Trump, F.D.A. Authorizes Plasma Therapy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2020, at A1 (reporting that Trump
had made an “unfounded claim that the F.D.A. was deliberately holding up decision-making until after
the election, this time citing a ‘deep state’”); Sheila Kaplan, F.D.A. Chief Besieged by Politics at Key
Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2020, at A1 (suggesting that “the F.D.A. has never been pushed as hard
as it is being pushed now”).
168
See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 197–98 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Michael D.
Shear & Pam Belluck, Obama to Drop Limit on Selling a Contraceptive, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at A1.
169
See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II,
§ 251, 110 Stat. 847, 857, 868–74 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808). Commonly referred to as
the Congressional Review Act (CRA), it only recently has had much of an impact. See Coral Davenport,
Tool Wielded by Trump May Roll Back His Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2020, at A18 (reporting that,
after the CRA got used only once during its first two decades, Republican lawmakers successfully
deployed it fourteen times in 2017 to wipe out regulations promulgated late in the Obama administration).
See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening the Congressional Review Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 187 (2018).
170
See Implementation of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,702,
91,713–15 (Dec. 19, 2016) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 421).
171
See Pub. L. No. 115-8, 131 Stat. 15 (2017); see also Implementation of the NICS Improvement
Amendments Act of 2007, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,741 (May 18, 2017) (withdrawing the rule).
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chambers. Alternatively, Congress could include a rider in the next
appropriations bill that the President would find harder to veto—this would
delay implementation of the rule and, if regularly added to subsequent
appropriations measures, might block it indefinitely.173
B. Statutory Objections and Misconceptions
As mentioned at the outset, just over twenty years ago the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the FDA’s effort to regulate tobacco products as restricted
devices.174 Although the decision may have signaled a subtle shift in the
judicial deference typically accorded to agency interpretations of statutory
ambiguities, it hardly settled questions that a comparable effort to regulate
guns and ammunition would raise. The Brown & Williamson majority spoke
with a single voice—in an opinion authored by Justice O’Connor—as did
the four dissenters in an opinion penned by Justice Breyer. The conservative
members of the Court seemingly set aside their usual commitments to
textualism,175 not even prompting a brief concurring opinion from Justice
Scalia to reiterate his strict views about the appropriate places to look for
congressional intent,176 while the Court’s liberal wing largely hewed to the
statutory text in dissent.177 Even more striking than their contrasting
approaches to the language appearing in various relevant statutes, or their
broader views of comparative institutional competence, both sides labored
under serious misapprehensions about the operation of the FDCA.178 As a

172
Then again, political calculations might prompt a President unwilling to directly countermand
the initiative of an agency housed within the Executive branch to allow a legislative override of a
controversial rule to take effect.
173
For examples involving gun violence, see supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
174
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
175
Cf. id. at 132 (“In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue,
a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. The
meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
context.”); id. at 133 (“Similarly, the meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly
where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand.”). The opinion,
however, went rather far beyond such a contextual analysis. It even took seriously the views about the
reach of the FDCA that a single member expressed during a floor debate leading to the passage of an
entirely different piece of legislation. See id. at 154.
176
See Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency
Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 269 (2000) (“Except in rare cases to confirm that an apparently absurd
result was not in fact what the legislature had intended, the adherents of this [textualist] approach, most
notably Justice Scalia, adamantly refuse to consider a statute’s legislative history.” (footnote omitted));
see also John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2419–20 (2003) (noting
the tension in his position and that of other textualists). The Brown & Williamson majority opinion never,
however, invoked the “absurd result” justification for looking beyond the statutory text.
177
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 162–63, 167–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 191
(“Previous FDA disclaimers of jurisdiction may have helped to form the legislative atmosphere out of
which Congress’ own tobacco-specific statutes emerged. But a legislative atmosphere is not a law, unless
it is embodied in a statutory word or phrase.”).
178
In each of the next two Terms, the Court again demonstrated fundamental failures to understand
the intricacies of the FDCA. See Noah, supra note 82, at 55 n.109 (noting that Thompson v. Western
States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002), “hardly represents the first time that members of the same
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consequence, and putting aside for one moment the fact that the high Court’s
membership has become still more polarized on questions of these sorts in
the intervening two decades, one can find surprisingly little meaningful
guidance about how the Court might assess the hypothetical FDA initiative
sketched out in Part I.
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,179
the Supreme Court famously held that, unless Congress had spoken clearly
to the precise issue presented, judges must defer to reasonable agency
interpretations of the latter’s enabling statutes.180 This position sprang in part
from the view that Congress had intended to delegate interpretive authority
to agencies rather than the courts.181 What, however, about novel agency
claims of jurisdiction that it had never before exercised, which begged the
question of congressional intent to delegate? The FDA’s tobacco regulations
offered the Court a golden opportunity to confront this question.182
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Brown & Williamson
purported to apply the Chevron framework. Justice O’Connor concluded at
“Step One” that Congress had spoken clearly to the question of whether the
FDA had authority over tobacco products as conventionally marketed,183
while Justice Breyer found ambiguity in the broad delegation of authority,
which the agency reasonably could construe as reaching what it now had
come to characterize as nicotine delivery devices.184 The clarity discerned
by the majority required some fancy footwork.
Justice O’Connor made much of the fact that, once it exercised device
jurisdiction, the FDA would have no choice but to ban tobacco products,

Court entirely misunderstood the complicated operation of the FDCA and its many amendments,” citing
Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001), as a prior instance of this tendency).
179
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
180
See id. at 842–43.
181
See id. at 843–44. Relative expertise and electoral accountability offered additional rationales.
See id. at 865–66.
182
See Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative
Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1466–67 (2000) (“[T]he nature of ‘jurisdictional’ questions, in
administrative law as elsewhere, demands special attention from the courts. By granting the
government’s petition for certiorari to review the lower court’s invalidation of the tobacco regulations
promulgated by the FDA, the Supreme Court appears poised to tackle the question directly this Term.”
(footnote omitted)); id. at 1529 (“When it resolves the tobacco industry’s challenge to the agency’s novel
assertion of regulatory jurisdiction later this Term, the Supreme Court will have an important opportunity
to recalibrate the balance of power between the three branches of government.”).
183
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126 (“Congress has clearly precluded the FDA from
asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. Such authority is inconsistent with the intent that
Congress has expressed in the FDCA’s overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific legislation
that it has enacted subsequent to the FDCA.”); id. at 132 (“[Even if] a product can be ‘intended to affect
the structure or any function of the body’ absent claims of therapeutic or medical benefit, the FDA’s
claim to jurisdiction contravenes the clear intent of Congress.”); id. at 133 (“Congress has directly spoken
to the issue here and precluded the FDA’s jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.”); id. at 161
(“Reading the FDCA as a whole, as well as in conjunction with Congress’ subsequent tobacco-specific
legislation, it is plain that Congress has not given the FDA the authority that it seeks to exercise here.”).
184
See id. at 162–74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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which would plainly contravene congressional intent. The regulation
promulgated in 1996 sought, however, only to restrict marketing to underage
consumers, and the agency had explained at length why it decided against
taking any more draconian steps. Nonetheless, the majority read the FDCA
as forcing the agency’s hand insofar as tobacco products could not possibly
satisfy statutory safety requirements.186 The prohibitions on various forms
of adulteration and misbranding, which Congress made applicable to devices
in 1938, may well have allowed the FDA to institute enforcement actions
against tobacco product manufacturers, but, as Justice Breyer emphasized in
dissent, these provisions did not obligate the agency to do so.187 Indeed, in a
significant 1985 decision cited by neither side, the Court had held that the
FDA enjoyed largely unreviewable enforcement discretion in the face of
complaints by death row inmates that the use of prescription drugs for lethal
injection violated many of these same provisions.188
Justice O’Connor also referenced the premarket review provisions as
obligating the FDA to prohibit marketing of devices absent proof of safety
and effectiveness.189 No one doubts that the agency could have taken such
an extreme step if so inclined,190 but, as explained previously, it has long
allowed the continued marketing of Class III devices without demanding
that manufacturers file applications for premarket approval accompanied by
evidence documenting a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.191
Moreover, as Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent, if the sponsor of every
185
See id. at 139 (majority opinion) (“[T]he collective premise of these [subsequently enacted
tobacco-specific] statutes is that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco will continue to be sold in the United
States. A ban of tobacco products by the FDA would therefore plainly contradict congressional policy.”).
186
See id. at 135–36; see also id. at 142 (“What the FDA may not do is conclude that a drug or
device cannot be used safely for any therapeutic purpose and yet, at the same time, allow that product to
remain on the market. Such regulation is incompatible with the FDCA’s core objective of ensuring that
every drug or device is safe and effective.”).
187
See id. at 174–78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–38 (1985). More recently, after uncovering evidence
that, in response to domestic supply shortages, the FDA had cleared the importation of an unapproved
version of a drug used for lethal injections, a group of death row inmates filed a successful lawsuit
challenging the agency’s action. See Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (affirming an order that
enjoined the agency from allowing further sales to state correctional departments of unapproved sodium
thiopental from foreign manufacturers not registered with the FDA because the statutory provision
governing drug importation unambiguously dictated refusal of entry under such circumstances).
189
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 136–37, 142–43; see also id. at 143 (“If they cannot be
used safely for any therapeutic purpose, and yet they cannot be banned, they simply do not fit.”); id. (“[I]f
tobacco products were within the FDA’s jurisdiction, the Act would require the FDA to remove them
from the market entirely. But a ban would contradict Congress’ clear intent as expressed in its more
recent, tobacco-specific legislation. The inescapable conclusion is that there is no room for tobacco
products within the FDCA’s regulatory scheme.”).
190
See id. at 159 (“[T]he FDA contends that, were it to determine that tobacco products provide no
‘reasonable assurance of safety,’ it would have the authority to ban cigarettes and smokeless tobacco entirely.”).
191
See supra Part I.D. The dissenting opinion failed to pick up on this point even though just four
years earlier it had played a central role in a tort preemption decision involving an allegedly defective
cardiac pacemaker. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 479 (1996) (“[T]he § 510(k) premarket
notification process became the means by which most new medical devices—including Class III
devices—were approved for the market.”); id. at 493–94; id. at 513 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (agreeing that premarket notification would not preempt a design defect claim).
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new drug and device must demonstrate that these products can achieve a
“therapeutic” purpose to offset any risks of harm, it would render the
structure-or-function definitional clauses surplusage.192 To make this point
more strongly, under the majority’s reading of the FDCA, prescription
products and implants serving only cosmetic purposes that the FDA
currently regulates as drugs or devices would become unlawful unless
entirely benign, which is rarely the case.193
Once the feared tobacco prohibition reveals itself as nothing more than
a strawman argument, the supposed misfit under the FDCA evaporates, as
does the apparent incompatibility with congressional design. Even if the
FDCA only allowed but did not require banning cigarettes and so forth once
treated as medical devices, Justice O’Connor viewed such a possibility as
inconsistent with the intent of Congress as reflected in several pieces of
tobacco-specific legislation coupled with the repeated statements of FDA
officials disclaiming any such authority.194 Preliminarily, she regarded these
“subsequent” enactments as more telling than the broad delegation of
authority to the FDA in 1938, 195 entirely ignoring the fact that Congress had
made major amendments to the device provisions—including the
all-important definition, grant of authority over the advertising of restricted
devices, and criteria for regulating combination products—in 1976 and
1990;196 indeed, to the extent that the premarket review provisions might
have forced the agency to ban intrinsically unsafe devices, these arrived on
the scene long after the most substantial tobacco-specific statutes that
supposedly evidenced a congressional intent incompatible with the prospect
of a prohibition.
Moreover, Justice O’Connor noted that Congress explicitly stripped the
192

See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 168 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839,
863–66 (2009).
194
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 144 (“Congress’ tobacco-specific statutes have effectively
ratified the FDA’s long-held position that it lacks jurisdiction under the FDCA to regulate tobacco
products.”); id. at 156; id. at 157–58 (“Congress consistently evidenced its intent to preclude any federal
agency from exercising significant policymaking authority in the area. Under these circumstances, we
believe the appropriate inference—that Congress intended to ratify the FDA’s prior position that it lacks
jurisdiction—is unmistakable.”). Writing two years before the Supreme Court’s decision, I called this “a
fairly compelling historical record.” Noah, Regulating Cigarettes, supra note 6, at 682 (“The legislature’s
failure to address the FDA’s role is notable but hardly surprising given the Agency’s own prior view that
it lacked anything other than a limited authority to regulate tobacco products under its enabling statute.”);
see also id. at 680–81 (summarizing this record). Nonetheless, I would have invalidated the assertion of
jurisdiction over tobacco products on entirely other grounds. See infra note 217.
195
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143; see also id. at 133 (“[T]he meaning of one statute
may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more
specifically to the topic at hand.”); id. at 137 (“Congress has directly addressed the problem of tobacco
and health through legislation on six occasions since 1965.”). The dissent found no evidence that these
subsequent enactments reflected a congressional directive ousting the FDA from potentially exercising
jurisdiction over tobacco products. See id. at 181–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 242 (2011) (“Post-enactment legislative history (a contradiction in terms) is
not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation.”).
196
See supra note 90.
193
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197

CPSC of tobacco product jurisdiction in 1976, but it failed to do the same
for the FDA even though the Medical Device Amendments passed that very
same year would have offered a perfect vehicle for doing so. True, Congress
had not previously enacted bills that would have explicitly authorized FDA
regulation of tobacco products,198 but, as Justice Breyer explained, it
similarly had failed to pass proposed legislation that would have done the
opposite.199 Although the failure to deploy the then-new procedure for
expedited congressional review, which only recently has come into regular
use,200 to override the FDA’s 1996 rule would hardly qualify as an
endorsement by Congress that should impact judicial review of an agency’s
statutory authority, the dissent emphasized that sweeping amendments to the
FDCA passed just one year later took care to remain noncommittal about the
tobacco rule.201
Justice O’Connor also explained that some of the tobacco-specific
legislation that required health warnings had expressly preempted different
state or federal requirements.202 Although such provisions may well limit the
application of some of the FDA’s misbranding powers or else constrain its
decisions about certain aspects of product labeling at the time of premarket
review, that possibility hardly would have rendered the assertion of device
jurisdiction somehow fundamentally incompatible with these narrower
legislative mandates,203 and, of course, the particular regulation under
scrutiny in no sense intruded on the already occupied domain.
Lastly, though a feature mentioned in the very first paragraph of the
majority’s opinion,204 Justice O’Connor repeatedly emphasized that the
agency routinely had disavowed the authority that it now asserted.205 As she
recounted, more than half a dozen officials over the years had expressed the
197
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 151. This had happened in tandem with reminding the
Commission that it could not regulate firearms. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
198
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 144, 146, 147; cf. id. at 155 (“We do not rely on Congress’
failure to act—its consideration and rejection of bills that would have given the FDA this authority—in
reaching this conclusion.”).
199
See id. at 183 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
200
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
201
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 184, 191–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. United States v.
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979) (“[D]eference is particularly appropriate where, as here, an [FDA]
interpretation involves issues of considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct
any misperception of its statutory objectives.”).
202
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 148–49, 154, 156.
203
See id. at 149 (“This is not to say that the FCLAA’s pre-emption provision by itself necessarily
foreclosed FDA jurisdiction.”).
204
See id. at 125 (noting that the FDA had “expressly disavowed any such authority since its inception”).
205
See, e.g., id. at 146 (“The FDA’s disavowal of jurisdiction was consistent with the position that
it had taken since the agency’s inception. As the FDA concedes, it never asserted authority to regulate
tobacco products as customarily marketed until it promulgated the regulations at issue here.”); id. at 156
(“[T]he FDA repeatedly and consistently assert[ed] that it lacks jurisdiction under the FDCA to regulate
tobacco products as customarily marketed.”); id. at 157 (“When the FDA repeatedly informed Congress
that the FDCA does not grant it the authority to regulate tobacco products, its statements were consistent
with the agency’s unwavering position since its inception, and with the position that its predecessor
agency had first taken in 1914.”).
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position that the FDA did not enjoy jurisdiction over tobacco products unless
accompanied by drug-like claims.206 The agency also twice during the Carter
administration had denied citizen petitions asking that it assert authority over
tobacco products.207
As Justice Breyer explained, agencies enjoy the opportunity to change
their minds, so long as they offer an explanation—whether related to newly
discovered information, intervening changes in the applicable legal standards,
or even a revised political judgment.208 Chevron itself, of course, represented
a striking about-face, with the EPA amending a rule promulgated at the end
of the Carter administration just one year later after President Reagan took
office, yet the Court credited the fact that the agency had consistently
interpreted the disputed statutory term inconsistently.209 Thus, agencies
remain free to revisit interpretations of their enabling statutes even after
courts have endorsed the earlier views.210 Surely the uncodified opinions
expressed by officials many years (even decades) earlier does not somehow
estop an agency,211 though it plainly troubled the majority that members of
Congress detrimentally relied on contemporaneous statements by the FDA
disclaiming any authority when they crafted tobacco-specific legislation.212
In the two decades that followed, the Supreme Court has in various ways
continued to narrow Chevron’s operation, and now some observers forecast

206

See id. at 145, 146, 151–52, 153, 154–55.
See id. at 152–53 (discussing the rejection of a pair of petitions filed by Action on Smoking &
Health (ASH)).
208
See id. at 186–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655
F.2d 236, 242 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Nothing in this opinion should suggest that the Administration is
irrevocably bound by any long-standing interpretation and representations thereof to the legislative
branch. An administrative agency is clearly free to revise its interpretations. . . . [H]owever, it must
provide a reasoned explanation for its action.”).
209
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 857, 863 (1984).
210
See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 616
(2009) (“[A] judicial determination that an agency interpretation embodies one option within the zone of
indeterminacy makes it possible for the agency to put forth a different interpretation at a later time.”);
see also Nat’1 Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (“[I]f
the agency adequately explains the reasons for a reversal of policy, change is not invalidating, since the
whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the
implementing agency.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
211
See Noah, supra note 88, at 130–33.
212
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 144 (“In adopting each statute, Congress has acted against
the backdrop of the FDA’s consistent and repeated statements that it lacked authority under the FDCA
to regulate tobacco absent claims of therapeutic benefit by the manufacturer.”); id. at 147 (“[T]his intent
is certainly relevant to understanding the basis for the FDA’s representations to Congress and the
background against which Congress enacted subsequent tobacco-specific legislation.”); id. at 153
(“Against this backdrop, Congress enacted three additional tobacco-specific statutes over the next four
years that incrementally expanded its regulatory scheme for tobacco products.”); id. at 156 (“Congress
has affirmatively acted to address the issue of tobacco and health, relying on the representations of the
FDA that it had no authority to regulate tobacco. It has created a distinct scheme to regulate the sale of
tobacco products, focused on labeling and advertising, and premised on the belief that the FDA lacks
such jurisdiction under the FDCA.”); id. at 159 (“This is hardly an ordinary case. Contrary to its
representations to Congress since 1914, the FDA has now asserted jurisdiction to regulate an industry
constituting a significant portion of the American economy.”).
207
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213

its imminent demise. Commentators have dubbed Brown & Williamson as
adopting the “major questions” exception,214 even though that particular turn
of phrase came only in the majority’s quotation from an article penned by
then-Judge Breyer.215 To be sure, O’Connor repeatedly opined that tobacco
products occupied a central role in the economy and culture of the United
States,216 but that left what else might qualify as a major question very much
in the eye of the beholder.217 In 2013, however, the Court emphatically
rejected efforts to treat jurisdictional questions as outside of Chevron’s rule
of deference.218
How does our hypothetical FDA initiative to regulate guns and
ammunition as devices compare under the analysis crafted by the majority
in Brown & Williamson? Tobacco products cause roughly ten times as many
deaths as do firearms, and evidently all uses of the former contribute
marginally to health risks while the latter have both safe and unsafe patterns
of use. Unlike tobacco products, guns and ammunition do not amount to
213
See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, To Repudiate or Merely Curtail? Justice Gorsuch and Chevron
Deference, 70 ALA. L. REV. 733, 751–55 (2019); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613,
1615–19, 1664–79 (2019); Justin Walker, The Kavanaugh Court and the Schechter-to-Chevron
Spectrum: How the New Supreme Court Will Make the Administrative State More Democratically
Accountable, 95 IND. L.J. 923, 947–62 (2020).
214
For useful summaries of pertinent decisions and the scholarly debate, see Joshua S. Sellers,
“Major Questions” Moderation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 930, 932–35, 939–48 (2019); and Daniel
Hornung, Note, Agency Lawyers’ Answers to the Major Questions Doctrine, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 759,
760–66, 783–84, 788–99 (2020).
215
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159 (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)). Like other efforts to critique
colleagues for staking out contrary positions in a case before the Court, this reference comes across as
more of a dig for hypocrisy than an intent to endorse the concept. The dissent, however, questioned the
existence or wisdom of any such canon of construction. See id. at 190–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
216
See id. at 133 (majority opinion) (“[W]e must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the
manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political
magnitude to an administrative agency.”); id. at 147 (“Given the economic and political significance of
the tobacco industry at the time [i.e., 1938], it is extremely unlikely that Congress could have intended
to place tobacco within the ambit of the FDCA absent any discussion of the matter.”); id. at 159 (“Owing
to its unique place in American history and society, tobacco has its own unique political history.”); id. at
160 (“[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic
and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”); see also Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (“When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded
power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy,’ . . . we typically greet its
announcement with a measure of skepticism.”); cf. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Although it is nominally a canon of statutory construction, we apply the major
questions doctrine in service of the constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative
power by transferring that power to an executive agency.”).
217
To be entirely clear, I believe that the Court reached the correct result but for the wrong reasons.
I would have treated jurisdictional questions as beyond Chevron’s reach. See Noah, supra note 182, at
1516–30; id. at 1467 (arguing that “Chevron deference should not extend to the review of jurisdictional
questions”). In the alternative, I would not have allowed agencies to stack multiple claims for Chevron
deference. See Noah, Regulating Cigarettes, supra note 6, at 686 (“[P]erhaps [the district court judge]
recognized that each prior act of deference to the FDA’s statutory interpretation compounded the tenuous
nature of the Agency’s overall assertion of jurisdiction, so much so that the final and seemingly easiest
request for deference was more than he could permit.”). Insofar as the Court adopted neither one of those
rationales and Chevron deference remains available, an FDA assertion of device jurisdiction over guns
and ammunition may well deserve to get judicial deference.
218
See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296–307 (2013).
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drug-device combinations, so they seem to fit more readily within the device
category. As far as I know, FDA officials only once disclaimed the power to
regulate firearms (though only as drugs) in the course of testifying before
Congress—and more than half a century ago at that—about an altogether
different subject (and not in the course of proposing legislation on that
subject, much less firearms).219 Similarly, it never before has denied a citizen
petition requesting such a move. Thus, the record related to the possibility
of exercising device authority over guns and ammunition differs from the
repeated expression of agency views that it lacked the authority to regulate
tobacco products unless marketed with drug-like claims. Indeed, the
apparent need to openly disavow having such authority itself demonstrates
that this hardly represented a far-fetched idea, which might have served to
alert Congress that it might want to explicitly bar any such effort.220
No one can doubt that the power of the FDA to regulate the firearms
industry would qualify as a major question, even if the agency’s initial
assertion of such jurisdiction accompanied an extremely modest regulatory
obligation. As far as I know, Congress has never considered bills that would
have either specifically authorized or prohibited FDA jurisdiction to regulate
firearms,221 which again stands in stark contrast to the record with tobacco
products. To be sure, congressional activity demonstrates a desire to leave
firearm manufacturers as well as their customers relatively unencumbered,
though the sole express preemption clause ousts only state common law.222
In short, if the template reflected by the majority opinion in Brown &
Williamson controls, then the FDA would stand a far better chance of
skirting statutory objections to a rule asserting device jurisdiction over guns
and ammunition.
219
See supra note 86. The agency similarly once expressed doubts to Congress over its power to
regulate whole organs without seeming to subsequently feel particularly constrained by such prior views.
See Lars Noah, Growing Organs in the Lab: Tissue Engineers Confront Institutional “Immune”
Responses, 55 JURIMETRICS 297, 311 (2015).
220
One commentator proposed a narrowing construction to exclude from the FDA’s jurisdiction
three different categories of “nonmedical” devices, including the following:

The third category, an area under section 201(h) into which FDA has not yet ventured,
includes products used to prevent injury (for example, bicycle helmets and
bullet-proof vests), cause injury (mace and guns), or prevent environmental threats
(radon detectors and video display terminal shields). The primary rationale for
excluding these items from FDA regulation is that already they are regulated
competently by other federal agencies, such as CPSC, OSHA, or EPA, and FDA lacks
the special expertise or the statutory mission to regulate these products.
Gamerman, supra note 91, at 853. Notice that his stated rationale did not mention the ATF and referenced
only statutory “mission” rather than the broad language that Congress selected in defining devices. Cf.
id. at 851 (allowing that device jurisdiction would include products intended “invasively to alter a bodily
function or structure”).
221
It would not surprise me, however, to find that at some point someone had introduced a bill that
sought to make unmistakable the FDA’s lack of authority.
222
See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Although not framed in express preemption terms,
Congress plainly meant to do so when in 1986 it granted narrow protection to the interstate transportation
of unloaded and inaccessible weapons. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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When Congress feared that other agencies might overstep their bounds,
it expressly barred those initiatives; when Congress sensed that state law
might unduly intrude on matters affecting interstate commerce, it expressly
blocked those threats.223 Congress has not, however, limited the FDA’s
power to use its existing authority over devices to regulate manufacturers of
firearms and bullets. As suggested in the previous section, it might well do
so if confronted with such an initiative in the future, but that prospect hardly
disables the agency under existing statutory arrangements.
C. Second Amendment Rights and Wrongs
A court inclined to invalidate an initiative to regulate guns as devices
would hardly need to resort to constitutional analysis. If the agency managed
to surmount the statutory obstacles, however, then it would have to confront
objections based on the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Even
so, device regulation by the FDA might offer some intriguing ways of
potentially skirting the federal right to bear arms as presently understood.
Moreover, the unexpected retirement (or leftward drift) of a couple of the
conservative members of the high Court could lower both the statutory and
constitutional hurdles that would otherwise stand in the way of the agency.
In 2008, a closely divided U.S. Supreme Court decided District of
Columbia v. Heller.224 The Court’s five conservative members struck down
the District’s longstanding prohibition on the possession of handguns and a
requirement for securing other loaded firearms with trigger locks. Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the Second Amendment protected
an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home.225
The four liberal members of the Court joined in a pair of dissenting
opinions.226 Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,227 a slightly
more fractured Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated this
same right as against the states.228 These decisions left many questions
unanswered and have prompted a lively academic commentary.229 So far,
223

See supra Part I.B.
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
225
See id. at 635.
226
See id. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
227
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
228
See id. at 791 (plurality opinion). The author of the majority opinion in Heller filed a concurrence
for the sole purpose of more fully answering the approach offered by one of the dissenting Justices. See
id. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring). Another member of the Heller majority wrote separately to offer a
somewhat different analysis of the incorporation issue. See id. at 805 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (preferring to use the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause
rather than its due process clause). The same four members of the Court dissented, though they did not
all join in the pair of opinions. See id. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (for himself alone); id. at 912
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor).
229
See, e.g., JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT:
RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER (2018); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second
Amendment Originalism and the Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187 (2015);
Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 63 (2020);
224
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however, apart from a short per curiam opinion subsequently explaining that
stun guns also enjoy protection, 230 the Supreme Court has not offered further
clarification about the scope of the Second Amendment right.231 What clues
do these decisions offer about the constitutionality of an FDA assertion of
device jurisdiction over guns and ammunition?
After a lengthy historical exegesis on the meaning of the Second
Amendment, the majority in Heller equivocated on precisely what form of
heightened scrutiny to apply.232 In his opinion for the four dissenters, Justice
Stevens offered a persuasive critique of the majority’s historical analysis.233
Meanwhile, in his opinion for the four dissenters, Justice Breyer carefully
undertook the sort of intermediate scrutiny or interest-balancing analysis
entirely glossed over by the majority when it invalidated the District’s
handgun prohibition.234
The majority conceded that the Second Amendment hardly granted
individuals an absolute right to possess arms.235 More interestingly, the
majority summarily carved out some forms of gun control as permissible:
Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1507–08 (2018); Symposium, Heller at Ten, 46 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 509 (2019); Symposium, The Second Generation of Second Amendment Law and Policy,
80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017, at 1.
230
See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411, 412 (2016) (per curiam); see also id. at 412, 420
(Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“While less popular than handguns, stun guns are widely owned and
accepted as a legitimate means of self-defense across the country.”); People v. Webb, 131 N.E.3d 93, 98
(Ill. 2019); Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 94 N.E.3d 809, 814–15 (Mass. 2018); Adam Winkler, Is the
Second Amendment Becoming Irrelevant?, 93 IND. L.J. 253, 254 (2018) (arguing that the unanimous per
curiam opinion in Caetano “signals that Heller is secure as a precedent”).
231
See Robert Barnes, Court Declines to Take a Handful of Gun Rights Cases, BOS. GLOBE, June
16, 2020, at A4 (“The court’s most conservative members at various times have expressed frustration
that their colleagues have routinely turned down requests to evaluate laws that impose tough restrictions
for permits to carry guns outside the home and ban certain types of weapons.”); see also Adam Liptak,
Court to Hear Case on Limit to Gun Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2021, at A1 (reporting that the Court
agreed to “review a longstanding New York law that imposes strict limits on carrying guns outside the
home, setting the stage for its first major Second Amendment decision in more than a decade—and the
first to be decided by the court’s newly expanded conservative majority”).
232
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 & n.27 (applying some form of heightened scrutiny); id. at 634–
35 (responding to the dissent’s criticism of its failure to elaborate on the standard of review, but rejecting
an interest-balancing approach).
233
See id. at 640 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding it “abundantly clear that the Amendment should
not be interpreted as limiting the authority of Congress to regulate the use or possession of firearms for
purely civilian purposes”); id. at 679 (“Until today, it has been understood that legislatures may regulate
the civilian use and misuse of firearms so long as they do not interfere with the preservation of a wellregulated militia.”).
234
See id. at 714 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The upshot is that the District’s objectives are compelling;
its predictive judgments as to its law’s tendency to achieve those objectives are adequately supported;
the law does impose a burden upon any self-defense interest that the Amendment seeks to secure; and
there is no clear less restrictive alternative.”); id. (finding no undue burden in part because “[t]he law
concerns one class of weapons, handguns, leaving residents free to possess shotguns and rifles, along
with ammunition”); id. at 719–20 (criticizing the majority’s failure to put as much effort into trying to
apply its newfound right to the facts before it); id. at 722 (“One cannot answer those questions by
combining inconclusive historical research with judicial ipse dixit.”).
235
See id. at 626 (majority opinion) (“[T]he right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely
explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
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[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms.236
If the FDA asserted device jurisdiction over guns and ammunition, then it
would test the reach of the allowance for restrictions related to commercial
sales.237 Obviously, a right to possess firearms implies that suppliers would
enjoy some correlative right to sell these products.238
More importantly for present purposes, the Heller Court limited Second
Amendment protection to commonly used weapons.239 It plainly did not

whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”); cf. id. at 635 (“The Second Amendment . . . elevates above all
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”).
236
Id. at 626–27; see also id. at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory
measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”); id. at 632 (“Nor,
correspondingly, does our analysis suggest the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to
prevent accidents.”); id. at 635 (“[F]or those regulations of the right that we describe as permissible . . . [,]
there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we have
mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.”); cf. id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
majority implicitly, and appropriately, rejects [strict scrutiny] by broadly approving a set of laws—
prohibitions on concealed weapons, forfeiture by criminals of the Second Amendment right, prohibitions
on firearms in certain locales, and governmental regulation of commercial firearm sales—whose
constitutionality under a strict-scrutiny standard would be far from clear.”); id. at 721 (“Why these? Is it
that similar restrictions existed in the late-18th century? The majority fails to cite any colonial
analogues.”); Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller
and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1386 (2009) (“These exceptions will ultimately have to
be justified under some standard of scrutiny . . . possibly under an undue-burden or an
intermediate-scrutiny test.”).
237
See, e.g., Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 976–86 (9th Cir. 2018) (upholding the constitutionality
of a California law requiring magazine safety features and the “microstamping” of discharged bullets
with identifying information).
238
See Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 677–90 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); id. at 682
(“Commerce in firearms is a necessary prerequisite to keeping and possessing arms for self-defense, but
the right of gun users to acquire firearms legally is not coextensive with the right of a particular proprietor
to sell them.”); Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Business of Guns: The Second Amendment and Firearms
Commerce, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5, 30, 36–41 (2018); see also Lars Noah, Does the U.S. Constitution
Constrain State Products Liability Doctrine?, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 189, 216–17 & n.150 (2019) (explaining
that, in the contraception context, “these represent two sides of the same coin”). The FDA generally does
not enjoy authority over end users, which means that any restrictions on the production and sale of guns
and ammunition would not impact the continued possession of existing stockpiles.
239
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (“We also recognize another important limitation on the right to
keep and carry arms. . . . [T]he sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the time.’”); id.
(conceding that this would allow a ban on “M-16 rifles and the like” even though less sophisticated
“small arms” in common use may have little value against modern military threats); id. at 625 (“[T]he
Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for
lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”). The dissenters expressed puzzlement over this
“circular reasoning.” Id. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 720–21 (“Nor is it at all clear to
me how the majority decides which loaded ‘arms’ a homeowner may keep. . . . In essence, the majority
determines what regulations are permissible by looking to see what existing regulations permit.”); id. at
721 (“On the majority’s reasoning, if tomorrow someone invents a particularly useful, highly dangerous
self-defense weapon, Congress and the States had better ban it immediately, for once it becomes popular
Congress will no longer possess the constitutional authority to do so.”).
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thereby mean only firearms used by the Founders, but it did suggest that
this “limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting
the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’”241 Who decides what
weapons so qualify and what level of specificity to use in defining such an
unprotected class? The broad sweep of the District’s prohibition—namely,
all handguns—allowed the majority to use a high level of generality,242 but
what about restrictions applicable to narrower subsets thought to carry
marginally higher dangers?243 Finally, what about ammunition? The
majority offered no hint of whether the Second Amendment would impact
laws limiting access to certain classes of projectiles used in firearms,244
240
See id. at 582 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the
founding.”).
241
Id. at 627; see also Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 447–51 (5th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a challenge
to the federal prohibition on machine guns manufactured after 1986 because these firearms qualify as
dangerous and unusual); cf. Joseph Blocher, Hunting and the Second Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 133, 176 (2015) (“If it is true . . . that long guns are useful for hunting but not for self-defense, then
the Second Amendment protection of those guns should be correspondingly weaker.”).
242
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (“The [District’s] handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire
class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose [i.e.,
self-defense].”); id. at 629 (“[H]andguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for
self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”); id. at 636 (“[T]he
enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table. These include
the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home.”); see also Jordan E.
Pratt, Uncommon Firearms as Obscenity, 81 TENN. L. REV. 633, 636–37 (2014); Eugene Volokh,
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a
Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1457 (2009) (“How can we decide whether, say, a
hypothetical ban on revolvers bans ‘an entire class of “arms”’ or only a subclass of the broader class of
handguns?”); id. at 1479 (“Handguns are in common use, but particular brands of handguns are less
common, and some are uncommon, simply because they come from small companies or are of unusual
caliber or design.”); id. at 1481 (“[W]hether a weapon is in common use depends a lot on how generally
one defines the weapon: for instance, as a handgun generally, or as a Glock 17 in particular.”).
243
In subsequent litigation between these same parties, the question arose with respect to certain
semiautomatic rifles such as the AR-15 and large-capacity magazines. Compare Heller v. District of
Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1260–64 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that, even if they qualified as in common
use, the prohibition survived intermediate scrutiny), with id. at 1286–90 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting);
see also supra note 104 (discussing the popularity of semiautomatic firearms). Other courts have
upheld state and local bans on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines. See, e.g., Worman v.
Healey, 922 F.3d 26, 35–36, 39–41 (1st Cir. 2019); Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 134–35 (4th Cir.
2017) (en banc) (joining four other federal appellate courts that previously had rejected such
challenges); id. at 135–37, 141–44 (holding that assault rifles and large-capacity magazines fall entirely
outside of the Second Amendment); id. at 138–41, 145–46 (explaining in the alternative that, even if
covered, the state prohibition would survive intermediate scrutiny); see also Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.4th
1087, 1100–13 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (rejecting Second Amendment and Takings clause objections
to California’s prohibition on the possession of large-capacity magazines); Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol
Clubs, Inc. v. Atty. Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 116–23 (3d Cir. 2018) (rejecting a constitutional challenge
to New Jersey’s prohibition on the possession of large-capacity magazines); Cody J. Jacobs, End the
Popularity Contest: A Proposal for Second Amendment “Type of Weapon” Analysis, 83 TENN. L. REV.
231, 251–89 (2015) (endorsing the tendency of the lower federal courts in such cases to focus on
dangerousness and utility for self-defense rather than resorting to imprecise measures of popularity).
But see David B. Kopel, The History of Firearms Magazines and of Magazine Prohibition, 78 ALB. L.
REV. 849, 883–84 (2015) (concluding that state bans on large-capacity magazines are unconstitutional).
244
Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 684–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (During the colonial period, “several
towns and cities (including Philadelphia, New York, and Boston) regulated, for fire-safety reasons, the
storage [in the home] of gunpowder, a necessary component of an operational firearm.”); Obermeier,
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though such an end-run obviously could gut the newfound right to bear arms
for self-defense in the home.245
McDonald offered rather less guidance about the contours of the right to
bear arms, focusing instead on the question of the Second Amendment’s
application to states and their subdivisions.246 As the FDA plainly exercises
federal authority, the debate over incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment need not detain us. Notably, however, in explaining the
fundamental nature of the right recognized in Heller, Justice Alito’s opinion
for the plurality found it inconsequential that “intense disagreement [exists]
on the question whether the private possession of guns in the home increases
or decreases gun deaths and injuries.”247 He also saw no relevance in the fact
that “England, Canada, Australia, Japan, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg,
and New Zealand either ban or severely limit handgun ownership.”248 The
plurality reiterated Heller’s dicta about “longstanding regulatory measures”
that permissibly limited gun possession,249 prompting the dissenters to again
point out the failure to explain why these but not others passed muster.250
The FDA already regulates several other products that enjoy special
constitutional protection, including but not limited to contraceptives,251 so
the fact that the Second Amendment comes into play would hardly exempt
firearm manufacturers from that agency’s device jurisdiction even if it might
constrain the reach of potentially applicable safety regulations. Fundamental
rights do not entitle citizens to access any and all means for pursuing a

supra note 107, at 710–12 (discussing Heller’s possible application to restrictions on different types of
exotic ammunition).
245
See Jackson v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014) (The Second Amendment
“does not explicitly protect ammunition. Nevertheless, without bullets, the right to bear arms would be
meaningless. . . . [It] implies a corresponding right to obtain the bullets necessary to use them.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 968–70 (affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction against a local
prohibition only against the sale of hollow-point ammunition after applying intermediate scrutiny);
Herrington v. United States, 6 A.3d 1237, 1243 (D.C. 2010) (“[G]iven the obvious connection between
handgun ammunition and the right protected by the Second Amendment, we are hard-pressed to see how
a flat ban on the possession of such ammunition in the home could survive heightened scrutiny of any
kind.”); see also supra note 243 (referencing court decisions upholding restrictions on large-capacity
magazines); cf. Nicholas J. Johnson, The Power Side of the Second Amendment Question: Limited,
Enumerated Powers and the Continuing Battle over the Legitimacy of the Individual Right to Arms, 70
HASTINGS L.J. 717, 763 n.204 (2019) (noting that the federal government strictly rationed ammunition
during World War II).
246
See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is clear that
the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among
those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”).
247
Id. at 782–83.
248
Id. at 781. Instead, he took comfort in the fact that amicus briefs in support of the petitioners had
been filed on behalf of majorities in Congress as well as among the states. See id. at 789.
249
See id. at 786.
250
See id. at 925 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (complaining that this “haphazardly created a few simple
rules”).
251
See Lars Noah, State Affronts to Federal Primacy in the Licensure of Pharmaceutical Products,
2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 16–19, 46–47; see also Noah, supra note 82, at 65–95 (discussing commercial
speech constraints).
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constitutionally protected purpose.
Perhaps the application of PMN
requirements, with 1976 serving as the initial baseline, to bar the
introduction of novel and more dangerous firearms would operationalize
Heller’s “in common use” standard.253 Similarly, if the FDA can encourage
the introduction of marginally safer models, then long-used types of firearms
and ammunition that have become unduly dangerous by comparison may
lose their protected status under the Second Amendment.254
CONCLUSION
Perhaps this Article represents a gag after all, designed to illustrate
rather starkly where an excessive faith in the good sense of bureaucrats
might lead us.255 Then again, given the increasing partisanship that infects
our three branches of government,256 an administrative approach may offer
a second best way of addressing a serious problem that has gone largely
unaddressed for far too long. Experts embedded in regulatory agencies enjoy
some insulation from the increasingly crass political calculus that impacts
their executive, legislative, and even judicial overseers—yes, although not
elected like many of their brethren in the state courts, persons anxious to join
252
See Michael R. Ulrich, A Public Health Law Path for Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 71
HASTINGS L.J. 1053, 1079–84 (2020); see also Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the
Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 664 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional regard
for procreative liberties should not stand as an obstacle to the withdrawal of fertility drugs if the FDA
decides that they no longer represent safe and effective products, just as it would not prevent the agency
from denying a marketing application for a new fertility drug that failed to satisfy normal criteria for
approval.”); id. at 663 (“The well-established right to avoid procreation by choosing from among safe
and effective methods of contraception or abortion does not translate automatically into a right to
procreate by any means that someone may desire.”); id. at 664 (“Even in the context of abortion, where
the right to privacy and the protection of liberty interests continue to erect a barrier against government
intrusion absent compelling justifications unattainable by other means, the Supreme Court has not gone
so far as to deregulate the choice of methods.”).
253
See supra note 161 and accompanying text; cf. Howell Raines, Opinion, To Fix Our Gun Laws,
We Should Go Back to the 1960s, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2019, at A15 (“No one argued that a six-shot
revolver was inadequate for home-protection emergencies. Deer and elk hunters who used larger-caliber
rifles felt amply equipped with standard magazines of a half-dozen or so cartridges.”). In judging other
burdens on fundamental rights, federal decisions about availability may help to define the baseline
against which to judge the constitutionality of state restrictions. See Lars Noah, State Regulatory
Responses to the Prescription Opioid Crisis: Too Much to Tolerate?, 124 DICK. L. REV. 633, 662 (2020).
254
Cf. Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, Lethality, Public Carry, and Adequate Alternatives,
53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 279, 301 (2016) (“[I]f there are new technologies with which people can vindicate
their Second Amendment rights, policy-makers should have expanded discretion to regulate the public
carrying of deadly weapons.”); id. at 287 n.54 (“In 1791, a musket could typically fire three rounds in a
minute. . . . Today, even some non-military weapons can fire nine hundred rounds in the same amount
of time.”); Paul H. Robinson, A Right to Bear Firearms but Not to Use Them? Defensive Force Rules
and the Increasing Effectiveness of Non-Lethal Weapons, 89 B.U. L. REV. 251, 253 (2009) (“[A]s
non-lethal weapons become more available, the authority to use firearms in defense diminishes.”); id. at
254–58 (canvassing the range of options and forecasting continued technological improvements).
255
Cf. Noah, “Go Sue Yourself!,” supra note 8, at 693 (“Welcome to my waking nightmare.”).
256
See Lars Noah, BDSM in Administrative Procedure: Using Agency Guidance for Bondage and
Discipline, at 3 (Jan. 25, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3391569 (“When did legal academics become
so terribly trusting of regulatory officials . . . ? Perhaps it reflects a growing loss of faith in the other
institutions of government, making it seem like the civil servants occupying the Fourth Branch remain
the only adults left to run the country.”).
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or move up in the ranks of the federal judiciary increasingly must signal their
bona fides in playing to the incumbents’ base.257
Even if colorable arguments would support an FDA assertion of device
jurisdiction over guns and ammunition, I do not imagine for a moment that
this will ever happen.258 It would require vision by those put in charge of the
agency, tolerance by the White House, courage by just enough members of
Congress, and an open mind by the federal judges asked to assess statutory
and constitutional objections lodged against such an initiative. Talk about
daunting odds! Then again, crazier ideas have gotten traction, and the FDA’s
experience with tobacco products amply demonstrates that something
previously unthinkable and ultimately unsuccessful can still bear fruit.

257
Cf. Jeremy W. Peters, New Litmus Test for Trump’s Court Picks: Taming the Bureaucracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2018, at A1 (“Weeding out judicial candidates based on an ideological checklist is
something Democratic and Republican presidents have long done. But it is rare for a White House to be
so open about what it considers disqualifying.”); Rebecca R. Ruiz & Robert Gebeloff, More Than Others,
Trump Judges Show Penchant for Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2020, at A16 (“The judges who
exhibited the pattern included some who had been under consideration for the Supreme Court, and some
who had deep political connections on Capitol Hill.”).
258
Cf. Noah, supra note 13, at 37 (“Although these illustrations [such as handgun control] seem
fanciful, FDA action might not be entirely frivolous or implausible under its broad statutory authority to
regulate medical devices.”); Lars Noah, When Constitutional Tailoring Demands the Impossible:
Unrealistic Scrutiny of Agencies?, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1462, 1482 (2017) (“Perhaps narrow tailoring
is best understood as a thought exercise about ideal policy design, largely divorced from practical reality
(much like academia itself).”). Call me quixotic!

